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A LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR
REDUCING FRAUD IN THE CREDIT
REPAIR INDUSTRY
JAMES P. NEHF*
Large computer databases collect and distribute informa-
tion about the creditworthiness of most American adults. Busi-
nesses use this data to gauge the solvency of potential customers.
Yet the information in these vast computer files is often partly or
wholly inaccurate. Incorrect entries in his credit file may render
a consumer unable to obtain credit until such information is de-
leted. Removing this data is often difficult and costly.
In recent years a new industry has arisen to assist consum-
ers in their efforts to correct inaccuracies in their files. Compa-
nies, in exchange for a fee, promise to improve a person's credit
rating by challenging negative information that appears on her
credit report. Unfortunately, instances ofpoor service and fraud
in the credit repair industry are widespread, causing a rising tide
of consumer complaints. As a result, several states have sought
to regulate the activities of credit repair organizations, but with
limited success.
In this Article Professor Nehf claims that credit repair orga-
nizations have flourished because the Fair Credit Reporting Act
makes it difficult for consumers to remove mistakes from their
credit reports without outside assistance. He argues that in-
stances offraud would be greatly reduced if Congress would sim-
ply amend the Act to require better disclosure and simplify the
labor that consumers must undertake to investigate and remove
errors. Such a revision would reduce the need for consumers to
seek assistance from credit repair organizations. Professor Nehf
also argues that federal regulation of the credit repair industry is
needed to combat widespread fraud; he then analyzes current
state statutes regulating credit repair organizations in order to
provide a legislative framework for reform.
Potential creditors often seek information about consumers before
entering into long-term commercial relationships. Much of this data is
supplied by credit bureaus' that sell credit histories and other personal
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University. B.A. 1979, Knox College; J.D. 1983,
University of North Carolina. The author wishes to thank Julianne Cartmel and Andrew
Fernandes for their research assistance, and Mary Deer for her diligent secretarial services.
1. This Article uses the term "credit bureaus" to refer to organizations that regularly
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information about consumers to businesses interested in evaluating an
individual's credit risk. In recent years the use of credit by consumers
has increased dramatically,2 resulting in an unprecedented number of re-
quests for credit reports by the business community. Credit bureaus now
issue more than 450 million' reports on consumers each year.3
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),4 enacted in 1970, is the
principal federal statute regulating the activities of credit bureaus and
users5 of consumer reports, and establishing the rights of consumers af-
fected by the issuance of such reports. The statute is generally regarded
as one of the most vaguely written consumer protection statutes; as a
result, it historically has been poorly enforced.6 Recently, problems with
assemble and evaluate information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing credit reports to
third parties. Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, such organizations are called "consumer
reporting agencies." 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (1988). For a good description of the credit report-
ing system in the United States, see Paul B. Rasor, Financial Information, in PRIVACY LAW
AND PRACTICE 3.01[4]-[5] (George B. Trubow ed., 1987).
2. The average cardholder currently holds eight bank and store credit cards, and the
amount of consumer debt continues to rise each year. According to the American Institute for
Economic Research, consumer debt (including mortgage debt) equaled 72% of disposable in-
come in 1980. By 1988, the figure had risen to 91%. Credit card debt now totals over $200
billion. See Gerri Detweiler & Mary Beth Butieri, Getting Out of Debt: Part One, BANKCARD
CONSUMER NEWS, Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 1, 1. Outstanding credit card debt on Visa and Master-
Card accounts alone increased from $20 billion in 1981 to $154 billion in 1990. Glenn von
Nostitz & Michael Alcamo, Plastic Fantastic Profits, HARPER'S, Aug. 1991, at 56, 56-57.
3. Fair Credit Reporting Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs and
Coinage of the House Comm. on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
221 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 FCRA Hearing] (statement of Walter R. Kurth, President, Asso-
ciated Credit Bureaus). Outstanding consumer installment credit in 1989 was estimated to be
$700 billion. Id. at 223.
4. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1136 (1970) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1988 & Supp. 1989)). The FCRA was added as Title VI
to the Consumer Protection Act of 1968, and became effective April 24, 1971. See FEDERAL
TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY OR INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FAIR
CREDIT REPORTING ACT, printed in 55 Fed. Reg. 18,804, 18,828 (1990) [hereinafter STATE-
MENT OF GENERAL POLICY]. Many states also have credit reporting statutes that supplement
federal law. Such laws are valid if not inconsistent with provisions of the FCRA. See 15
U.S.C. § 1681t (1988). Most of the state laws contain provisions similar to the FCRA. See
WILLARD P. OGBURN, FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT 149-57 (2d ed. 1988).
5. Typically, "users" of reports are potential creditors, employers, or insurance compa-
nies who desire information about an applicant before deciding to do business with her. Land-
lords also use credit bureau services when reviewing tenant applications, but because of an
omission in the statute, landlords are not covered by the FCRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681m
(1988) (imposing duties only on those who use consumer reports for credit, insurance, or em-
ployment purposes). Businesses that use credit reports as the basis for refusing to accept pay-
ment by check also are not covered by the FCRA because acceptance of checks traditionally
has not been considered an extension of credit. See STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY, supra
note 4, cmt. 10 to § 615 (interpreting FCRA § 615 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681m (1988))), at
18,826.
6. See 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 211 (statement of Elgie Holstein, Executive
Director, Bankcard Holders of America); OGBURN, supra note 4, at 20.
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the Act have drawn great attention because the credit reporting industry
has changed dramatically during the twenty years since the law's enact-
ment. The industry has been transformed from an association of approx-
imately 2,000 community credit bureaus, which served largely as
independent clearinghouses for creditor review of a consumer's local
credit history, to a highly automated network of bureaus linked by three
nationwide computerized reporting services.7 This automation and in-
dustry concentration currently allows vast amounts of information about
virtually any consumer to be circulated easily and instantaneously to po-
tential creditors, employers, landlords, and insurance companies across
the country.
When the information contained in a consumer report is accurate
and complete, consumers and businesses generally benefit from this in-
creased efficiency.' If a report contains material errors, however, the re-
sulting consumer injury can be significant and difficult to remedy as the
inaccuracy is copied and automatically transmitted to credit bureaus
throughout the United States. An unfavorable credit report can prevent
a consumer from obtaining a broad range of valuable services. A con-
sumer's ability to receive credit, to rent an apartment, to cash a check, to
secure insurance, or to obtain employment all may be jeopardized. In
today's credit-dominated economy, it is therefore more important than
ever that consumers take adequate precautions to ensure accurate report-
ing of their credit histories.
Protecting the integrity of credit reports has proved to be a difficult
task.9 Despite nationwide educational efforts sponsored by state and fed-
eral consumer protection agencies,10 as well as informational campaigns
7. 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 221, 222, 227 (statement of Walter R. Kurth,
President, Associated Credit Bureaus). Each month approximately two billion lines of credit
history and two million public record items (eg., bankruptcy filings, court judgments) are
entered into the reporting system. Id. at 223. The three industry giants-TRW Credit Data
Division of southern California; CBI, Inc. of Atlanta, Georgia; and Trans Union Corp. of
Chicago, Illinois--often supply local bureaus with information upon request. Amendments to
the Fair Credit Reporting Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs and Coinage
of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 146 (1990)
[hereinafter 1990 FCRA Hearing] (statement of Edmund Mierzwinski, Consumer Advocate,
U.S. Public Interest Research Group); 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 290 (statement of
Robert Ellis Smith, Publisher, Privacy Journal); iL at 537 (statement of Gwen Moore,
Chairperson, California General Assembly).
8. Indeed, advanced technology may result in greater accuracy in consumer reports be-
cause it is less cumbersome now to report more information, including positive information
about a consumer. See 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 985 (statement of the Federal
Trade Commission).
9. See OGBURN, supra note 4, at 19-20 (discussing some of the reasons why consumers
seldom seek to enforce the FCRA).
10. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has issued several free brochures explaining
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by the three large credit reporting agencies,11 consumer awareness of the
contents of credit reports and rights under the FCRA is extremely dim.12
With their credit reputations at stake and with the potential for economic
injury relatively high, it is not surprising that an increasing number of
consumers are seeking outside assistance to assert the protections of the
FCRA. Over the last several years, credit service or credit "repair" orga-
nizations (CROs) have begun operating in virtually every state, 13 offering
(for a fee) to assist confused, frustrated, and sometimes desperate con-
sumers in their efforts to correct erroneous credit information and to im-
prove their credit records. 14
Although some CROs provide legitimate services to troubled con-
sumers," allegations of fraud frequently have surfaced, and in several
cases these charges have been well documented and publicized. Typical
complaints have alleged misrepresentations by the CRO that a con-
sumer's credit history can be improved when in fact it is reported accu-
rately and is not likely to change; refusals to honor money-back
guarantees as advertised; and charges of exorbitant fees (often several
hundred dollars) for providing few services and doing little that the con-
consumers' rights under the FCRA, including Solving Credit Problems, Scoring for Credit,
Building a Better Credit Record, and Fix Your Own Credit Problems and Save Money. See
1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 1066, 1078, 1082 (reproducing these brochures); Jean
Noonan, Federal Trade Commision Activity: Pursuing Unfair and Deceptive Practices in Con-
sumer Financial Services, 43 Bus. LAW. 1069, 1079 (1988). See generally 1989 FCRA Hearing,
supra note 3, at 313, 314, 325 (statement of Janet D. Steiger, Chairperson, FTC). The Federal
Reserve Board (FRB) also publishes explanatory information, see id. at 618 (statement of Alan
Greenspan, Chairman, FRB), as do state consumer protection agencies, see, e.g., id. at 560
(statement by William N. Lund, Superintendent, Maine Bureau of Consumer Protection).
11. The trade association representing credit bureaus publishes several explanatory pam-
phlets. See 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 230-31 (statement of Walter R. Kurth, Presi-
dent, Associated Credit Bureaus); id, at 138 (statement of Edward A. Barbieri, Vice President
& General Manager, TRW Credit Data Division).
12. Id at 215 (statement of Elgie Holstein, Executive Director, Bankcard Holders of
America); id at 951 (reproduction of letter from Daniel Oliver, FTC, to Rep. Frank Annunzio
(May 11, 1987)).
13. One attorney general has noted that the credit repair business did not begin to flourish
until 1985 and did not exist when the FCRA was enacted in 1970. 1986 Op. Va. Att'y Gen.
33; see Credit Repair Organizations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs and
Coinage of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
119-25 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 CRO Hearing] (statement of the FTC).
14. One court has defined a CRO as a business which, "for a fee, will seek to advise
consumers of their rights with respect to consumer credit reports and to assist consumers in
correcting or deleting information in credit reports that is improper under the [FCRA]." A-1
Credit & Assurance Co. v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 678 F. Supp. 1147, 1148 (E.D. Pa.
1988).
15. See generally 1988 CRO Hearing, supra note 13, at 25 (statement of Elena Halford,
President, American Association of Credit, Inc.).
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sumer could not do by himself under the law.' 6 The problems have been
exacerbated by consumers' discoveries that the CRO often has gone out
of business and cannot be located soon after the transgression occurred. 17
Consumer complaints have prompted many states to enact legisla-
tion regulating CROs,'8 but problems persist for two reasons. First, be-
cause many consumers find it difficult to understand and enforce their
rights under the FCRA without assistance,' 9 a CRO still can attract a
substantial amount of business from consumers who trust the CRO's
purported expertise and who believe its promises of miracle cures. Sec-
ond, CROs are highly mobile enterprises. They can operate interstate
with little difficulty through media advertisements and toll-free telephone
numbers, and can change locations quickly, thereby eluding local en-
forcement efforts.2" Consequently, since 1988 Congress has been study-
ing legislation that would regulate CROs nationally.2'
This Article argues that a double-barrelled federal attack on this
growing problem is necessary to protect unsuspecting consumers and to
restore consumer confidence in the credit industry. First, federal regula-
tion of CROs is necessary to address the interstate nature of the problem.
More important, Congress should amend the FCRA to cure its obvious
defects and to make the law easier to enforce without the assistance of
third parties. CROs proliferate in part because the FCRA is not easily
understood by consumers and is in dire need of revision to reflect the
modem realities of the credit reporting business. Without reform of the
FCRA, CROs will continue to find a market among confused consumers
16. Id. at 138-40 (statement of Kenneth P. Walton, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal
Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation); id at 124 (statement of Jean Noonan,
Associate Director for Credit Practices, FTC); COMMERCIAL LAW AND PRACTICE, COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES, RETAIL FINANCIAL SERVICES 1989, FTC ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES
(June 1, 1989) (summarizing FTC actions against six CROs); Anne P. Fortney, Consumer
Credit Compliance and the Federal Trade Commission: Continuing the Process of Education
and Enforcement, 41 Bus. LAw. 1013, 1019 (1986); Noonan, supra note 10, at 1071-72; see
infra text accompanying note 111. Other recent credit-related scams include fraudulent
promises of instant credit by calling a "900 number" (calls that can cost $50 or more), and
offers of credit opportunities to consumers who disclose their checking account number for
"verification" (numbers then used to create counterfeit checks drawn against the consumer's
account). See FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, How TO SPOT CREDIT REPAIR SCAMS 1 (1991).
17. Informal surveys in 1988 by two of the largest credit bureaus showed that at least one-
half of CROs move or go out of business within one year. 1988 CRO Hearing, supra note 13,
at 124 (statement of L. Jean Noonan, Associate Director for Credit Practices, FTC).
18. See infra notes 116-65 and accompanying text.
19. See OGBURN, supra note 4, at 19-20.
20. See 1988 CRO Hearing, supra note 13, at 77 (reproduction of advertisement); id. at 83,
94 (reproductions of various promotional materials); id. at 23 (statement of George L. Ray-
burn, Assistant Commissioner of Consumer Credit, State of Maryland).
21. Several bills addressing CROs have been introduced in the present Congress. See, eg.,
H.R. 421, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 194, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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who are willing to pay substantial sums for the promise of a clean credit
record. If Congress makes the FCRA more "user friendly" and provides
a stronger framework for ensuring that consumer reports will be accu-
rate, the problem of CRO fraud may dissipate as the market for credit
repair services shrinks.
This Article presents a legislative framework for reducing CRO
fraud. Part I provides an overview of consumer rights under the FCRA
and highlights the principal inadequacies of the current law as a guardian
of consumer interests. Part II describes the operation of the CRO, the
abuses that have surfaced to date, and the enforcement efforts taken by
state consumer protection agencies and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) to combat the problem. Part III reviews the laws regulating
CROs that many states recently have enacted and evaluates these laws as
models for federal CRO legislation. Part IV proposes amendments to the
FCRA that would provideconsumers with a greater opportunity to pro-
tect the integrity of their credit reports with less reliance on CROs or
other outside assistance.
I. CONSUMER RIGHTS UNDER THE FCRA
Enacted in 1970 as a new title to the Consumer Credit Protection
Act of 1968,22 the FCRA aims to protect consumers from inaccurate or
obsolete information in reports that businesses use to determine a per-
son's eligibility for credit, employment, or insurance. 23 The legislation is
not a pure consumer protection statute, however; it was drafted to ac-
commodate the sometimes conflicting goals of facilitating the free flow of
information about consumers while ensuring the issuance of substantially
accurate reports. The law seeks to balance the interests of consumers in
having accurate credit reports against the desire of the business commu-
nity to obtain quick and inexpensive data necessary to make informed
commercial decisions. Thus, while the law attempts to ensure that credit
22. The enormous expansion of consumer credit after World War II led to the enactment
of perhaps the most significant federal consumer protection law, the Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act of 1968 (CCPA), Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (1988 & Supp. 1989)). Title I of the CCPA generally is referred to as the
Truth-in-Lending Act. Congress subsequently amended the CCPA with the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1136 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1681-1681t (1988 & Supp. 1989)), the Fair Credit Billing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat.
1512 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666j (1988)), the Consumer Leasing
Act, Pub. L. No. 94-240, 90 Stat. 257 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667-1667e
(1988)), and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1988 & Supp. 1989)).
23. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1988 & Supp. 1989); Milbauer v. TRW, Inc., 707 F. Supp.




bureaus issue consumer reports fairly and respect the consumer's right to
privacy, it does not mandate completely accurate consumer reports.24
The principal means of ensuring accuracy is to afford the individual a
reasonable opportunity to correct any errors that may have occurred.25
The FCRA thus provides a base level of consumer protection that relies
heavily on consumers monitoring their reports. This balance between
business and consumer interests, with its dependence on consumer self-
policing, inadequately protects credit-seeking consumers.
A. Accuracy
To prove a bureau's violation of the minimum accuracy require-
ments imposed by the FCRA, a consumer first must establish that the
report is materially incorrect. Early court decisions applied a narrow test
of accuracy and rejected claims that the information contained in a re-
port, while technically correct, was misleading, incomplete, or irrelevant.
For example, in Todd v. Associated Credit Bureau Services, Inc.26 a report
disclosed that the consumer's $1,200 debt had been turned over to a col-
lection agency, but it failed to note that the consumer had paid the debt
in full prior to the date on which the report was issued. The court held
that although the report was not complete and may have been mislead-
ing, it was not inaccurate because the reported information was literally
true.27 Similarly, the court in Austin v. BankAmerica Service Corp.28 re-
jected the claim of a consumer whose report disclosed that he was a de-
fendant in a lawsuit but omitted the fact that he was sued only in his
official capacity as a deputy sheriff.29 Decisions such as these have been
24. Section 607(b) of the Act requires that credit bureaus maintain "reasonable proce-
dures to assure maximum possible accuracy" in consumer reports. 15 U.S.C. § 168le(b)
(1988). Determining, whether a bureau's procedures are reasonable requires balancing both
business and consumer interests. See Stewart v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 47, 51 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); Alexander v. Moore & Assocs., Inc., 553 F. Supp. 948, 952 (D. Haw. 1982); infra
notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
25. DIVISION OF CREDIT PRACTIcEs, FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, COMPLIANCE WITH
THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT pt. II (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter COMPLIANCE WITH THE
FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT], reprinted in 5 Consumer Cred. Guide (CCII) 11,303 (Feb.
19, 1980).
26. 451 F. Supp. 447 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1978), cert denied,
439 U.S. 1068 (1979).
27. Id. at 449.
28. 419 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
29. Id. at 732; see also Colletti v. Credit Bureau Servs., 644 F.2d 1148, 1151 (5th Cir.
1981) (holding that Credit Bureau Services's failure to reflect total account information did not
constitute negligence); Wright v. TRW Credit Data, 588 F. Supp. 112, 114 (S.D. Fla. 1984)
(holding that no cause of action exists against a credit agency for failing to print explanatory
information); McPhee v. Chilton Corp., 468 F. Supp. 494, 497 (D. Conn. 1978) (holding that
failure to include bankruptcy information in credit report did not make report inaccurate);
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subject to criticism,30 and courts recently have upheld consumer claims
when the report is technically accurate but misleading. When informa-
tion is so incomplete as to be extremely misleading and when clarifying
information is readily obtainable, courts may find that the accuracy re-
quirement of the FCRA has been violated.31
Even if a consumer can establish that the report contains inaccurate
or extremely misleading information, the credit bureau still may not have
violated the act. The FCRA does not mandate accurate credit reports,
only that credit bureaus maintain "reasonable procedures" to assure
"maximum possible accuracy."32 In any action against a credit bureau
for inaccurate reporting, the consumer has the additional burden of prov-
ing that the bureau did not have reasonable procedures in place. 33 While
the law does not specify the precise procedures a bureau must establish,
the FTC has issued guidelines and general standards that bureaus are
expected to follow. 34 For example, bureaus should implement proce-
dures to ensure that employees are properly trained to create, update,
and release consumer reports, and that data is properly recorded and
reproduced. Agencies that transmit data electronically over long dis-
tances (the dominant method under current practice)35 must exercise
care to ensure that the information is properly converted to computer
format and that it is neither modified nor susceptible to unauthorized
access during transmission. The FTC also discourages certain credit bu-
reau policies thought to invite inaccurate reporting, such as maintaining
quotas or creating financial incentives for investigators to uncover nega-
Middlebrooks v. Retail Credit Co., 416 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (D. Ga. 1976) (holding that inclu-
sion of arrest report in credit update does not constitute grounds for liability).
30. See generally Carla S. Harwitt, Note, Fair Credit Reporting: Are Misleading Reports
Reasonable?, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 111, 114-27 (1980) (proposing balancing test rather than
strict standards for determining inaccuracy); G. Allan Van Fleet, Note, Judicial Construction
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act: Scope and Civil Liability, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 458, 491-506
(1976) (advocating a less restrictive role for civil actions under the FCRA).
31. See Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Houston v.
TRW Info. Servs., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 689, 693-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Alexander v. Moore &
Assocs., Inc., 553 F. Supp. 948, 952-53 (D. Haw. 1982); Miller v. Credit Bureau, Inc., [1969-
1973 Transfer Binder] Consumer Cred. Guide (CCI-) 99,173 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 22,
1972). See generally 2 HOWARD J. ALPERIN & ROLAND F. CHASE, CONSUMER LAW § 541,
at 250 (1986) (explaining obligations of reporting agencies to report accurately).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (1988).
33. Stewart v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 47, 51 (D.C, Cir. 1984); Hauser v. Equifax,
Inc., 602 F.2d 811, 814-15 (8th Cir. 1979).
34. See COMPLIANCE WITH THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING AcT, supra note 25, at pt. IV.
35. In 1989 more than 60% of credit bureaus maintained computer links with the three
national reporting services, and the trend is toward continued automation of the industry. See
1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 222 (statement of Walter R. Kurth, President, Associ-
ated Credit Bureaus).
[Vol. 70
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tive information about consumers. 6 As with the FCRA in general, de-
termining the reasonableness of reporting procedures requires balancing
the credit bureau's interest in minimizing time and expense against the
consumer's interest in accuracy.37
Consumers' concerns about inaccuracies in credit reports may be
well founded. One study estimates that more than forty percent of the
consumer reports existing in credit bureau data banks contain erroneous
information.3" The most common errors include mistaken information
about the status of an account or payment history, information on one
consumer mixed with data on a different individual, and the failure of the
credit reporting agency to remove obsolete information as required by
the FCRA.39 In today's automated reporting network any injury is
quickly compounded. Once inaccurate information enters the system, it
36. See In re Equifax, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 844, 1007-10 (1980), set aside in part, 678 F.2d 1047
(11 th Cir. 1982) (quotas on negative information ranging from 6% to 16%); COMPLIANCE
wrrT THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING AcT, supra note 25, at pt. IV. In the decade before
1983, the FTC devoted substantial resources to investigating credit-reporting industry proce-
dures, culminating in a consent order against Trans Union Information Systems. See Anne P.
Fortney, Consumer Credit Compliance and the Federal Trade Commission: Sketching the New
Directions, 39 Bus. LAw. 1305, 1313 (1984).
37. In Alexander v. Moore & Assocs., Inc., 553 F. Supp. 948 (D. Haw. 1982), the court
struck the balance in the following way:
Clearly, the more misleading the information, and the more easily available the clari-
fying information, the greater is the burden upon the consumer reporting agency to
provide this clarification. Conversely, if the misleading information is of relatively
insignificant value, a consumer reporting agency should not be required to take on a
burdensome task... and it should not be penalized ....
Id. at 952. See generally Barbara C. Sherland, Note, The Functions of Consumer Reporting
Agencies Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 59 WASH. L. REv. 401, 416 (1984) (discussing
consumer reporting agency as "conduit of information" until consumer disputes credit report).
38. See 1990 FCRA Hearing, supra note 7, at 137, 146 (statement of Edmund Mierzwin-
ski, Consumer Advocate, U.S. Public Interest Research Group) (reporting that, in a study of
1500 reports, up to 43% contain "serious" errors); id. at 521, 537 (statement of James R.
Williams, Chief Executive Officer, Consolidated Information Services, Inc.) (reporting that the
study revealed that 33% of erroneous files contained obsolete or outdated information, 27%
had incorrect credit ratings, 25% contained information not pertaining to the applicant, and
10% had conflicting information among reports supplied by the three major credit bureaus);
1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 287 (statement of Rep. E. Clay Shaw, Jr.); Ellen James
Martin, Make Sure Credit Report Has 411 Errors Corrected Before Applying For a Loan, INDI-
ANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 4, 1991, at 3 (reporting that American Civil Liberties Union estimates
that at least 30% of credit reports contain inaccuracies). The credit bureau trade association
disputes these figures. See 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 255 (statement of Walter P.
Kurth, President, Associated Credit Bureaus) (contending that less than one-half of one per-
cent of reports contain mistakes). In 1988, however, it reported that of nine million consumer
inquiries, three million, or one-third, resulted in corrections or amendments. 1990 FCRA
Hearing, supra note 7, at 146 (statement of Edmund Mierzwinski, Consumer Advocate, U.S.
Public Interest Research Group).
39. See 1990 FCRA Hearing, supra note 7, at 140-41, 145 (statement of Edmund
Mierzwinski, Consumer Advocate, U.S. Public Interest Research Group).
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can spread rapidly throughout the country to computer terminals be-
longing to creditors, employers, landlords, and insurance companies.40
Credit bureaus, of course, cannot be guarantors of completely accu-
rate information. Bureaus obtain most of the information in credit re-
ports from outside sources, typically businesses that extend credit and
provide payment histories to the bureau for inclusion in a consumer's file.
A bureau does not violate the FCRA when it fails to mention, for exam-
ple, that a consumer eventually paid an overdue retail account if neither
the store nor the consumer so informed it.41 Yet the FTC and the courts
have concluded that credit bureaus are not merely conduits of informa-
tion.42 If the bureau should reasonably be aware of errors that indicate
systemic problems or a pattern of unreliability with a particular source of
information, the bureau should evaluate its procedures and implement
cost-effective adjustments.43 In addition, the FCRA requires periodic re-
view of data to determine whether information has become obsolete or
misleading with the passage of time," and may require that bureaus
maintain records showing the relative accuracy of information provided
by their sources to determine which sources have submitted inaccurate
data.45 Bureaus also must exercise reasonable care to verify that the in-
formation in a report pertains only to the particular consumer about
whom the report was requested, in order to avoid mixing data on more
. 40. One of the ways information can enter the reporting system is through computer en-
tries made by an individual business which might, for example, report that a consumer's ac-
count is 60 days overdue. In one "automatic capturing" system, the central bureau's file
automatically accepted and copied a business's entire history on an individual when the busi-
ness accessed the central file. This facilitated the continuous updating of files, but because
special auditing procedures were not built into the system, erroneous information could enter
the central file unnoticed. See Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchants Ass'n, 682 F.2d
509, 511-12 (5th Cir. 1982) (system automatically "captured" a stranger's file and mixed the
information with data on the plaintiff).
41. STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY, supra note 4, cmt. 3F to § 607 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1681e (1988)), at 18,821.
42. See Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 689 F.2d 72, 78-79 (6th Cir. 1982); Chilton Corp. v. Moore,
508 S.W.2d 679, 682-83 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); COMPLIANCE WITH THE FAIR CREDIT RE-
PORTING ACT, supra note 25, at pt. IV.
43. See STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY, supra note 4, cmt. 3A to § 607 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1681e (1988)), at 18,820. In 1988, 18 years after the FCRA's enactment, the FTC
proposed official commentary on the Act. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STATEMENTS
OF GENERAL POLICY OR INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT, printed
in 53 Fed. Reg. 29,696 (1988). Final commentary was published in 1990. See STATEMENT OF
GENERAL POLICY, supra note 4, at 18,804. The official commentary supersedes previously
issued FTC compliance manuals and the numerous informal staff opinion letters and formal
FTC interpretations of the FCRA. See id. at 18,809.
44. COMPLIANCE WITH THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT, supra note 25, at pt. IV; see
OGBURN, supra note 4, at 80.
45. See Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1234, 1240-42 (E.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 689
F.2d 72 (6th Cir. 1982).
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than one consumer."
B. Obsolete Information
Except in transactions involving large amounts of money, credit bu-
reaus may not disclose adverse information that is more than seven years
old (ten years for bankruptcies). 7 There is no requirement that a credit
bureau delete obsolete information from its files, only that it not include
such information in a report.4a Consumers can enforce this part of the
FCRA with relative ease because, unlike the disclosure of inaccurate in-
formation, a bureau's improper disclosure of obsolete information auto-
matically violates the FCRA regardless of the reasonableness of the
agency's procedures.49 While instances of unlawful disclosure of obsolete
information are not uncommon, many of the disputes over this section of
the FCRA center on whether the credit bureau had reasonable grounds
to believe that the information was being disclosed in connection with
one of the specified exempt transactions involving relatively large sums of
money. 0 To facilitate enforcement, the FTC has interpreted this section
as requiring the creation of separate files for obsolete information that
may be accessed only after the bureau determines that an exemption
applies.51
46. Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchants Ass'n, 682 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1982);
cf. Lowry v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 541, 544 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (holding that bureau
need not establish special procedures to ensure that information is accurate with respect to the
specific consumer about whom a report was requested).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (1988). The seven-year limit applies to civil lawsuits and court
judgments, paid tax liens, accounts placed for collection or written off as losses, records of
arrest, indictment, or conviction of a crime, and any other adverse information. Id
§ 1681c(a)(1)-(6). Exemptions include credit or life insurance transactions involving $50,000
or more, and employment positions with annual salaries of $20,000 or more. Id. § 1681c(b).
48. See Herring v. Retail Credit Co., 266 S.C. 455, 458-59, 224 S.E.2d 663, 664-65 (1976)
(holding that court cannot order bureau to delete obsolete information permanently from its
files).
49. Since reporting obsolete information is a per se violation of the FCRA, FTC staff
opinions and lawsuits often center on when the seven- or ten-year limitation period begins to
run. For a thorough discussion of this issue, see OGBURN, supra note 4, at 69-70.
50. Because obsolete information may be disclosed only in exempt transactions, credit
bureaus should keep the information in a separate file that is accessible only after the creditor
provides assurance that an exemption applies. The FCRA states that prospective users of
consumer reports must identify themselves to the bureau and certify the purpose for which the
information is sought. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a) (1988). For a discussion of exemptions, see supra
note 47 and accompanying text.
51. See COMPLIANCE WITH THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT, supra note 25, at pt.
IV.C.3.
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C. Consumer Access to Files
The only way consumers can ensure that their credit files are com-
pletely accurate is to discover and correct errors themselves. The FCRA
facilitates this task by giving consumers the right to learn the contents of
their credit bureau files.52 With few exceptions,53 the FCRA requires
that all information in a consumer's file be available upon proper advance
notice and identification. The consumer has no statutory right to receive
a copy of the report, however; 4 the consumer is entitled only to learn the
"nature and substance" of the report, 5 which means that the bureau
must explain the contents of the report, either in person or over the tele-
phone. 6 The FCRA uses the term "nature and substance" because Con-
gress recognized that in many cases the technical, sometimes coded,
information found in a consumer report will be meaningless to the con-
sumer if given verbatim. Despite the statutory language, many larger
bureaus provide a copy of the report and explain its contents if the con-
sumer requests.5
Recent studies show that credit bureau data banks contain more
than 500 million files; yet, consumers review only four million each
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (1988).
53. The exceptions are for medical information and the names of sources who provided
information used in an "investigative report." Id. § 1681g(a)(1), (2). The exception for medi-
cal information is apparently based on the concern that most consumers would not understand
medical data without the aid of a physician. See 1 ALPERIN & CHASE, supra note 31, § 264, at
457 n.3; MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD, CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS 186 (1983). The rationale
behind the exception for sources of information in an investigative report (defined in the
FCRA as a report based on interviews with persons concerning the subject's character and
reputation, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(e) (1988)) is that individuals will be more forthright in giving
candid opinions if assured that their identities will not be disclosed. I ALPERIN & CHASE,
supra note 31, § 264, at 458 n.4; see Retail Credit Co. v. Dade County, 393 F. Supp. 577, 581-
82 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (discussing disclosure requirement and exceptions thereto). The identity of
such sources is available to the consumer only through discovery procedures in a court action
brought under the FCRA. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(2) (1988).
54. For criticism of this omission, see JOHN R. FONSECA, HANDLING CONSUMER
CREDIT CASES 463 (3d ed. 1986) (indicating that the consumer should have the opportunity to
check the file "word for word" because he and the credit bureau may have differing views as to
what constitutes the "nature and substance" of the report).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1) (1988).
56. See STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY, supra note 4, cmt. 5 to § 609 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1681g (1988)), at 18,822. The bureau may choose to provide a copy of the report as
an alternative means of compliance. Id
57. See COMPLIANCE WITH THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT, supra note 25, at pt.
IV.C.4.
58. Increased automation in the industry has made written disclosure, with a copy of the
file, the most efficient method of compliance. See 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 252
(statement of Walter R. Kurth, President, Associated Credit Bureaus).
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year. 9 Critics of the FCRA attribute this low access rate to deficiencies
in the statute. Many consumers are not aware of their right to review
their files." Even when a creditor, employer, or insurance company uses
negative credit information to make an adverse decision, the FCRA does
not require that the consumer be informed of his right to review the re-
port that influenced the decision.6 The user of the report must inform
the consumer that a report was considered and must provide the name
and address of the bureau issuing the report, but the user has no further
obligations under the FCRA.62 The Act assumes that an interested con-
sumer will then contact the designated bureau, where he may be in-
formed of his right to disclosure of the contents of his fie, although the
statute does not require the bureau to disclose this right or the right to
dispute the accuracy of the report.63
Even if the consumer contacts the credit bureau and requests disclo-
59. See 1990 FCRA Hearing, supra note 7, at 538 (statement of James P. Williams, Chief
Executive Officer, Consolidated Information Services, Inc.).
60. See 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 201 (statement of Bonnie Guiton, Special
Advisor to the President for Consumer Affairs); id, at 208 (statement of Steven W. Hamm,
Administrator, South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs).
61. See id. at 201 (statement of Bonnie Guiton, Special Advisor to the President for Con-
sumer Affairs). Even though the law does not require that the creditor inform the consumer of
his right to review the report, some evidence exists that the process works well in practice. See
id. at 934-35 (statement of Janet D. Steiger, Chairperson, FrC).
62. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (1988). Even this obligation only applies to certain types of
users of consumer reports. See supra note 5 (noting that duty does not apply to landlords or to
businesses accepting payment by check). The FCRA does not require the user to state the
reasons for denying the application, but § 701(d) of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA) does require a statement of reasons when credit is denied. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2)
(1988); 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a), (b)(2) (1991). According to one study, a substantial percentage
of consumers will supply the creditor with corrective information after receiving a specific
notice of the reason why credit was denied. See Exercise of Consumer Rights Under the Equal
Credit Opportunity and Fair Credit Billing Acts, 64 FED. RESERVE BULL. 363, 365-66 (1978).
The ECOA disclosure requirement has been the subject of numerous enforcement actions in
which the FTC alleged a pattern of noncompliance. See United States v. Allied Fin. Co., No.
3-85-1933F (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 1985) (consent order); United States v. Fidelity Acceptance
Corp., Civ. No. 3-85-1588 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 1985) (consent order); United States v. Winkel-
man Stores, Inc., No. C85-2214 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 1985) (consent order).
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (1988); 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 201 (statement of
Bonnie Guiton, Special Advisor to the President for Consumer Affairs). The FTC has insti-
tuted several enforcement actions against creditors who failed to give consumers appropriate
notice of the adverse action pursuant to § 615 of the FCRA. See United States v. Norwest
Fin., Inc., No. 87 Civ. 06025R (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1986) (consent decree); United States v.
Strawbridge & Clothier, Inc., Civ. No. 85-6855 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 1985) (consent decree);
Allied Fin. Co., No. 3-85-1933F (consent order); Fidelity Acceptance Corp., Civ. No. 3-85-1588
(consent decree); Winkelman Stores, Inc., No. C85-2214 (consent order); United States v. Al-
lied Stores Corp., No. 83 Civ. 2730 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1984); In re Wright-Patt Credit Union,
106 F.T.C. 354, 358 (1985) (consent decree); In re Associated Dry Goods Corp., 105 F.T.C.
310, 314 (1985) (consent decree); In re Hospital & Health Servs. Credit Union, 104 F.T.C. 589,
593-94 (1984).
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sure, other obstacles may impede his ability to obtain complete disclo-
sure. The consumer may learn that the bureau charges a fee for
disclosure-often ten to twenty dollars-which the FCRA permits un-
less the bureau issued a report that a business used to deny credit, em-
ployment, or insurance within thirty days preceding the request.M  If the
consumer makes the request within the thirty-day window or pays the
fee, disclosure still may be largely incomplete. The credit bureau can
only disclose the information in its own file. Other credit bureaus in the
consumer's community or in other parts of the country may have files
containing information compiled from the same or different sources.
Many consumers are not aware of this, and the FCRA does not require
the bureaus to disclose this information. 5 Thus, even if the consumer
discovers and corrects erroneous information in the file of the bureau she
contacted, the same data may be present in the files of other bureaus that
potential creditors might use. Moreover, if the consumer discovers the
names and locations of other credit bureaus-in particular, those of the
three large national processing centers-he may have to pay a separate
fee for disclosure of the file in each bureau.66 In short, the FCRA does
little to facilitate consumer access to the universe of personal information
in credit files beyond the bureau to which the initial inquiry was made.
D. Correction of Erroneous and Misleading Information
Even if a consumer gains access to information stored in his file at a
credit bureau, the exercise yields no economic benefit unless erroneous or
misleading information is purged from the consumer reporting system. 67
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1681j (1988). See 1989FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 258 (statement of
Walter R. Kurth, President, Associated Credit Bureaus); Martin, supra note 38, at 3 (consum-
ers pay up to $20 for disclosure of credit reports).
65. See 1989FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 201-02 (statement of Bonnie Guiton, Special
Advisor to the President for Consumer Affairs). The three major credit bureaus are attempt-
ing to address this problem. See id. at 727 (statement of Edward A. Barbieri, Vice President &
General Manager, TRW Credit Data Division).
66. Section 612 of the FCRA mandates free disclosure of the report only from the bureau
whose report was used to deny credit, employment, or insurance within the 30 days prior to
the request. 15 U.S.C. § 168 1j. Other bureaus may charge a fee for disclosure, although some-
times the fee will be waived if the consumer was rejected based on a report issued by another
bureau. See 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 727 (statement of Edward A. Barbieri, Vice
President & General Manager, TRW Credit Data Division).
67. TRW, one of the three national credit bureaus, reported that in 1988 1.36 million
consumers requested disclosure of their files and that 20% of those persons registered disputes.
Of all such challenges only two percent resulted in changes to the file. See 1989 FCRA Hear-
ing, supra note 3, at 726 (statement of Edward A. Barbieri, Vice President & General Man-
ager, TRW Credit Data Division); cf. 1990 FCRA Hearing, supra note 7, at 146 (statement of
Edmund Mierzwinski, Consumer Advocate, U.S. Public Interest Research Group) (reporting
that nine million consumer inquiries were made in 1988; three million resulted in corrections).
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This is perhaps the area in which the FCRA is most seriously deficient.
In the abstract, the FCRA procedure for correcting inaccuracies ap-
pears straightforward and adequate. If a consumer questions the accu-
racy of a fie and believes that additional information would correct an
error or clarify a misleading statement, the bureau must investigate the
claim." The bureau must make a good faith investigation, which ac-
cording to the FTC means that, at a minimum, the bureau must verify
the information within a "reasonable time" by checking back with the
original source and confirming the data.69 The only exception to the in-
vestigation requirement is when the bureau has reason to believe that the
consumer's dispute is frivolous or irrelevant? 0 If after the investigation
the bureau agrees with the consumer and finds the information to be
inaccurate, it must delete the data from its files. 1 Moreover, if the infor-
mation can neither be confirmed nor denied within a reasonable time
(determined by the FTC to be thirty days in most cases), it must be de-
leted.72 If the consumer is not satisfied with the outcome of the investi-
gation, she may file with the bureau a brief statement clarifying her side
of the dispute.7" In subsequent reports, the bureau must note that the
item is disputed and must provide either the consumer's statement or a
clear summary of the dispute along with the report.74
If the investigation results in the deletion of information or the in-
clusion of a consumer's statement of dispute, the bureau must explain to
the consumer that she can instruct the bureau to provide the correction
to previous recipients of the report.75 Upon the consumer's request, the
bureau then must provide the new information to persons who received
the report for employment purposes within the past two years and to
other recipients within the last six months.76 In this way, the consumer
can attempt to correct any misimpressions caused by the release of in-
complete or erroneous reports in the recent past.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (1988).
69. See STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY, supra note 4, cmt. 2 to § 611 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1681i), at 18,823; COMPLIANCE WITH THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT, supra
note 25, at pt. IV.C.4(b).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a), (c); STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY, supra note 4, cmt. 11 to
§ 611 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681i), at 18,824; see infra text accompanying notes 105-06.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a).
72. Id.; STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY, supra note 4, cmt. 12 to § 611 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1681i), at 18,824.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(b).
74. Id. § 1681i(c); see STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY, supra note 4, cmt. 13 to § 611
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681i), at 18,824 (consumer may submit 100-word statement on each
disputed item).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(d).
76. Id. The bureau must disclose to the consumer the right to make such a request. Id.
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Notwithstanding its apparent simplicity and comprehensiveness,
this procedure for correcting inaccurate or incomplete files has proved
ineffective in practice. Several problems have surfaced. Perhaps most
importantly, because the FCRA does not require bureaus to inform con-
sumers of their rights under the statute, most consumers are not aware of
the procedures for disputing a file and relatively few take advantage of
the opportunity.77 The statute does not require bureaus to inform con-
sumers that the bureau must investigate disputed items.78 Bureaus are
not required to contact consumers when an investigation has been com-
pleted, to inform them of the outcome of the investigation, or to explain
why the bureau decided the issue as it did.79 Nor is the bureau obligated
to tell the consumer that she has a right to submit a statement disputing
the outcome of an investigation and that the statement, or a summary of
it, must appear on all future reports.8" Unless the consumer is aware of
these rights, she probably will not assert them.
In addition, some evidence suggests that investigations of disputed
information are often perfunctory and incomplete, with the bureau
merely returning to the original source, asking the same question, and
receiving the same response.81 Bureaus seldom go behind the affirma-
tions of their sources to determine the truth of an item.82 The FTC sug-
gests that although the bureau may rely on the accuracy of a source's
ledger sheets and other records, it should at the very least explain the
consumer's complaint and ask whether the source confirms the original
information, qualifies it, or accepts the consumer's explanation.83 Critics
77. Of the 500 million files on 200 million households in credit bureau data banks, only 4
million consumers asked to see their fies in 1989. 1990 FCRA Hearing, supra note 7, at 538
(statement of James R. Williams, Chief Executive Officer, Consolidated Information Services,
Inc.).
78. See OGBURN, supra note 4, at 109 (observing that courts have refused to require such
a duty under an analogous FCRA provision); cases cited infra note 80.
79. See 1990 FCRA Hearing, supra note 7, at 327 (statement of Elgie Holstein, Executive
Director, Bankcard Holders of America). Although the FCRA does not require that bureaus
inform consumers of the results of an investigation, all three of the major credit bureaus claim
that they regularly do so. See 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 727 (statement of Edward
A. Barbieri, Vice President & General Manager, TRW Credit Data Division).
80. See OGBURN, supra note 4, at 112. Courts have held that bureaus have no duty to
disclose this right. Roseman v. Retail Credit Co., 428 F. Supp. 643, 646 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Middlebrooks v. Retail Credit Co., 416 F. Supp. 1013, 1017-18 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
81. See 1990 FCRA Hearing, supra note 7, at 325 (statement of Elgie Holstein, Executive
Director, Bankcard Holders of America).
82. See 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 727 (statement of Edward A. Barbieri, Vice
President & General Manager, TRW Credit Data Division).
83. STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY, supra note 4, cmt. 2 to § 611 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1681i (1988)), at 18,823-24; COMPLIANCE WITH THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING
Acr, supra note 25, at pt. IV.C4(b). The FTC also has indicated that a proper investigation
should include an effort to contact any other sources named by the consumer who may have
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suspect, however, that even these minimum procedures often are not
followed.84
Consumers have charged that bureaus sometimes refuse to conduct
investigations by claiming that the consumer's dispute is frivolous or ir-
relevant.8 5 Bureaus use this statutory excuse most often when the con-
sumer wishes to add information to a report. The bureau typically
characterizes this information as merely an explanation of extenuating
circumstances for a negative item, rather than a dispute of the item's
technical accuracy. A common example of this situation occurs when a
consumer seeks to explain why he was fired from his former job. The
credit bureau's position has sometimes been upheld, particularly by
courts that have interpreted narrowly the FCRA's standard of "maxi-
mum possible accuracy." 86 Bureaus also refuse to reinvestigate disputes
previously resolved against consumers, a frustrating response when the
consumer believes that the original investigation was inadequate.8"
One of the most pressing problems for consumers is making sure
that erroneous or incomplete information is corrected in as many com-
puter data banks as possible, not merely in the files of the bureau initially
contacted. Several obstacles stand in the consumer's way. First, the con-
sumer must discover what information is in the other data systems.88
Under the current law bureaus need not inform consumers that other
systems exist, much less give them the names and addresses of the domi-
nant national data bases. More importantly, if an investigation results in
an item being deleted or modified in one bureau, or in the consumer's
information relevant to the dispute. See MID, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 415, 423 (1983) (consent
order).
84. See 1990 FCRA Hearing, supra note 7, at 327 (statement of Elgie Holstein, Executive
Director, Bankeard Holders of America).
85. See, eg., Hauser v. Equifax, Inc., 601 F.2d 811, 814 (8th Cir. 1979); Equifax, Inc., 96
F.T.C. 844, 1077-80 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 678 F.2d 1047 (11th Cir. 1982).
86. See, eg., Roseman v. Retail Credit Co., 428 F. Supp. 643, 645-46 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
The FrC has created a rebuttable presumption that a consumer's dispute is bona fide. STATE-
MENT OF GENERAL POLICY, supra note 4, cmt. 11 to § 611 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681i
(1988)), at 18,824. A dispute is not considered irrelevant unless the bureau can conclude that
the information is not "adverse"; it is not frivolous unless it is "clearly" beyond credulity or
made in bad faith. Equifax, 96 F.T.C. at 1078-79. The FTC has concluded that a bureau need
not investigate if the consumer merely gives a "reason for failing to pay a debt" rather than
challenging the item's accuracy. STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY, supra note 4, cmt. 4 to
§ 611 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681i), at 18,824.
87. STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY, supra note 4, cmt. 11 to § 611 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1681i), at 18,824. If the consumer provides additional evidence of an inaccuracy, the
bureau must reinvestigate. Id; see 1990 FCRA Hearing, supra note 7, at 326 (statement of
Elgie Holstein, Executive Director, Bankcard Holders of America).
88. See supra text accompanying note 65.
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explanatory statement89 being included in the file, there is no require-
ment that the bureau transmit that information to other data bases. Nor
is the source that initially provided the erroneous information to the bu-
reau required to notify other bureaus that it made a mistake. The con-
sumer must shoulder the burden of discovering the locations of other
reporting systems, examining their files, requesting additional investiga-
tions of disputed items (which probably will result in bureaus making
multiple verification requests to the same source), submitting additional
statements of dispute, and requesting that previous creditors receive the
updated information. Thus, the present structure not only makes bur-
densome demands on even the most sophisticated consumers, it also fos-
ters duplicative efforts by all segments of the reporting industry as the
same error is investigated and corrected several times.
II. TiE EMERGENCE OF CREDIT REPAIR ORGANIZATIONS
Most consumers are vaguely aware that information on their past
credit behavior exists in data banks somewhere in the country, but they
remain largely ignorant of the extent of the information being stored, the
location of the bureaus, and the inner workings of the reporting system.90
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that when a problem relating to a
credit report surfaces, many consumers lack a basic understanding of
their rights under the FCRA, the process for investigating the accuracy
of credit reports, and the mechanism for setting the record straight. 91
When consumers began to rely more heavily on credit to obtain desired
goods and services in the 1970s and 1980s, the frequency of their en-
counters with credit reports and bureaus increased. As consumer confu-
sion and ultimate frustration with the reporting system mounted,
entrepreneurs began filling the information gap with promises of assist-
ance to consumers whose credit reports were causing them difficulty. By
1984, the credit repair industry was active in most states, and credit re-
pair organizations (CROs) already were generating controversy. 92
89. Associated Credit Bureaus reports that approximately 100,000 consumers file explan-
atory statements each year. 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 256 (statement of Walter R.
Kurth, President, Associated Credit Bureaus).
90. See id. at 206-09 (statement of Steven W. Hamm, Administrator, South Carolina De-
partment of Consumer Affairs). In recent years employers have used credit reports even more
frequently as laws governing the use of polygraph tests have become stricter and quick charac-
ter checks on applicants are needed. See 1990 FCRA Hearing, supra note 7, at 148 (statement
of Edmund Mierzwinski, Consumer Advocate, U.S. Public Interest Research Group).
91. 1990FCRA Hearing, supra note 7, at 128-30 (statement of Janlori Goldman, Legisla-
tive Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
92. By 1984 the staff of the FTC had begun investigating "credit repair clinics" following
allegations of fraudulent representations. See Fortney, supra note 36, at 1309; see also 1988
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Troubled consumers need not have turned to CROs to guide them
through the intricacies of the FCRA. Free explanatory information-in
the form of brochures, pamphlets, and telephone advice-has been avail-
able for some time from the FTC, state consumer protection agencies,
and the large credit bureaus themselves.93 But for a variety of practical
reasons, many consumers nevertheless patronize CROs. Because CROs
advertise heavily in print and electronic media, they tend to be more visi-
ble than alternative sources of assistance.94 Moreover, some consumers
may have concerns about confronting large credit bureaus alone and per-
ceive CROs as providing the necessary "clout" as well as the expertise to
elicit prompt and effective responses from the business community.9 Fi-
nally, many consumers are drawn to CROs by claims of high success
rates, some as high as 100%, for fixing poor credit histories.96 Such
guarantees are particularly attractive to consumers who sorely need
credit but have poor credit records and desperately seek to keep their
homes, automobiles, and other valuable assets.97 As a result, credit re-
pair businesses, which require relatively little initial capital investment,
have become very lucrative. By 1987, one rather notorious CRO had
recorded six million dollars in accounts and had collected over two mil-
lion dollars from 9,000 consumers.98
By 1988, CROs had attracted considerable attention at both the
FTC and local consumer protection agencies as consumers began report-
ing a pattern of unethical, and in some cases fraudulent, activity. Ac-
cording to CRO critics, many consumers were promised full refunds if
their credit records were not improved, but the CROs often could not be
CRO Hearing, supra note 13, at 52-71 (providing excerpts from newspaper and television re-
ports exposing CRO scams).
93. See supra notes 10-11.
94. See, eg., 1988 CRO Hearing, supra note 13, at 72-103 (reproducing examples of CRO
advertisements in print media and samples of direct-mail promotional material).
95. See id. at 25-26 (statement of Elena Halford, President, American Association of
Credit, Inc.).
96. See id. at 72 (sample advertisement); id. at 3 (statement of Kenneth P. Walton, In-
spector, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
97. See 1990 FCRA Hearing, supra note 7, at 665 (statement of Jim Mattox, Attorney
General, State of Texas); 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 578-79 (statement of James M.
Shannon, Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts); 1988 CRO Hearing, supra
note 13, at 9 (statement of Michelle Arnold, former CRO employee).
98. Credit-Rite, Inc. was the subject of an FBI investigation in 1987. As a result of the
investigation, the principal managers of the company received prison terms of seven years.
The operations of Credit-Rite are described in 1988 CRO Hearing, supra note 13, at 137-40
(statement of Kenneth P. Walton, Inspector, Federal Bureau of Investigation). See also id. at
40 (statement of Walter R. Kurth, President, Associated Credit Bureaus) (describing Credit-
Rite as a member of a new industry that preys on overextended consumers and abuses certain
FCRA provisions).
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located or refused the refund after failing to deliver the promised results.
CROs also misled consumers by advertising guaranteed credit cards re-
gardless of credit history, but then offering the card only if the consumer
established a savings account with the issuing financial institution as col-
lateral. Some consumers claimed that CROs took their money and per-
formed virtually no services whatsoever.99
The practices that probably have caused the most controversy and
anger among the credit bureaus are the tactics CROs use to create good
credit records from bad. In addition to helping the consumer correct
errors in a credit report, CROs typically use two approaches to purge
unwanted items from data banks. One tactic is to inundate each of the
three major national credit bureaus with letters disputing virtually every
item in a consumer's file, even items about which there is no dispute,
thereby triggering a multitude of investigations under the FCRA.100 If a
credit bureau is mired in dispute letters, inevitably some of the investiga-
tions will not be completed within the thirty-day time limitation set by
the bureaus and the FTC, and the item often will be deleted from the file
until it can be verified.10 1 The second method of purging negative items
is to negotiate with the creditor on behalf of the consumer. The CRO
may persuade the creditor to accept a full or partial payment, or an ex-
tended payment plan, in exchange for the creditor withdrawing the nega-
tive information from each of the credit bureau's files in which the item
was originally reported. 0 2 Although in many cases these tactics have
99. See 1988 CRO Hearing, supra note 13, at 22 (statement of George L. Rayburn, Assis-
tant Commissioner of Consumer Credit, State of Maryland); id at 124 (statement of the FTC);
Fortney, supra note 16, at 1019-20; Noonan, supra note 10, at 1071-72; cf 1988 CRO Hearing,
supra note 13, at 25 (statement of Elena Halford, President, American Association of Credit
Inc.) (asserting that CROs do give refunds to dissatisfied customers; success ratio is 89-90%).
100. See 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 257 (statement of Walter R. Kurth, Presi-
dent, Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc.); id at 209 (statement of Steven W. Hamm, Administra-
tor, South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs); id. at 578-79 (statement of James M.
Shannon, Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts); id. at 948-49 (reproduction of
letter from Daniel Oliver, Chairman, FrC, to Rep. Frank Annunzio (May 11, 1987)); 1988
CRO Hearing, supra note 13, at 4 (statement of Kenneth P. Walton, Inspector, Federal Bureau
of Investigation).
101. See STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY, supra note 4, cmt. 10 to § 611 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1681i (1988)), at 18,824 (opining that for most disputes, "reasonable time" is 30
days).
102. See 1988 CRO Hearing, supra note 13, at 4 (statement of Kenneth P. Walton, Inspec-
tor, Federal Bureau of Investigation). This approach is not as offensive as the "shotgun" tactic
of disputing every item in the fie because the CRO and its client are, presumably, not misrep-
resenting any facts when they negotiate the resolution of a dispute with a creditor. This nego-
tiating tactic is endorsed by the National Consumer Law Center, one of the most respected.
consumer representatives in the country. See 1988 CRO Hearing, supra note 13, at 25 (state-
ment of Elena Halford, President, American Association of Credit, Inc.); OGBURN, supra note
4, at 351-53.
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succeeded in improving a consumer's credit history (at least temporar-
ily),103 credit bureaus complain, with some justification, that the deletion
of accurate information through this process undermines the integrity of
the reporting system. 1°4
The principal opponents of CROs have been credit bureaus and gov-
ernment agencies responsible for consumer protection. The obvious ten-
sion between CROs and credit bureaus has resulted in several bureaus
simply ignoring the communications of CROs on behalf of consumer cli-
ents. In many cases bureaus legally can refuse to investigate CRO-initi-
ated disputes by identifying them as frivolous or irrelevant.105 This
action finds support in the FCRA and is endorsed by the FTC.106 Such
refusals to investigate, however, require a line-by-line review of each dis-
pute and credit report, and often it will not be immediately obvious that a
dispute is meritless without at least some preliminary investigation,
which can be time consuming and costly. Thus, credit bureaus recently
have sought ways to avoid dealing with CROs altogether. For instance,
bureaus have maintained that information about credit files need not be
provided to a CRO or any person other than the consumer himself, citing
privacy concerns, FTC commentary, and language in the FCRA.1°7 If a
103. Information deleted because the bureau's investigation was not completed within 30
days likely will reappear in the file when the information is ultimately verified. Thus, the
report may be "repaired" for only a short while, although during that time the consumer may
be able to obtain credit, employment, or insurance from an unsuspecting business. See 1989
FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 578-79 (statement of James M. Shannon, Attorney General,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts); 1988 CRO Hearing, supra note 13, at 48 (statement of
Walter R. Kurth, President, Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc.).
104. See 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 948-49 (reproduction of letter from Daniel
Oliver, Chairman, FTC, to Rep. Frank Annunzio (May 11, 1987)); id. at 209 (statement of
Steven W. Hamm, Administrator, South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs); 1988
CRO Hearing, supra note 13, at 24, 49 (statements of Walter R. Kurth, President, Associated
Credit Bureaus, Inc.).
105. See 1990 FCRA Hearing, supra note 7, at 326 (statement of Elgie Holstein, Executive
Director, BankCard Holders of America); 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 257 (state-
ment of Walter R. Kurth, President, Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc.).
106. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a), (c) (1988). The FTC has stated that sending letters disput-
ing all information in a file without making specific allegations, or submitting multiple letters
in similar format, may indicate frivolous contentions. STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY,
supra note 4, cmt. 11 to § 611 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (1988)), at 18,824.
107. See A-1 Credit & Assurance Co. v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 678 F. Supp. 1147,
1149 (E.D. Pa. 1988); 1988 CRO Hearing, supra note 13, at 26, 109 (statement of Elena
Halford, President, American Association of Credit, Inc.). In enacting the FCRA, Congress
was concerned about bureaus respecting the privacy interests of consumers. The Act thus
permits disclosure of the file only for limited purposes. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1988 & Supp.
1989). Moreover, the Act provides that credit bureaus must disclose the contents of the report
"to the consumer-in person.., or by telephone." Id. § 1681h. The FTC appears to agree
with the bureaus that the FCRA requires disclosure only to the consumer personally. See
1988 CRO Hearing, supra note 13, at 28-29 (statement of Jean Noonan, Associate Director for
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CRO cannot gain easy access to the data in a client's file, its ability to
assist the client is severely impaired. Moreover, bureaus have refused to
honor dispute letters submitted by CROs, relying on language in the
FCRA that the consumer himself must register the dispute.10 8 This posi-
tion has received a warm response from the FTC,109 but it has been re-
jected by at least one court, which held that third parties may make
disputes if they have the consumer's written power of attorney and pres-
ent adequate identification. 110
The complaints of the powerful credit bureaus, combined with an
accelerating stream of consumer inquiries, led to several investigations of
CROs by the FTC and state consumer protection agencies in the mid-
1980s. The investigations generally resulted in allegations that the
targeted CROs misrepresented the services they could lawfully perform
on behalf of consumers."' In many of the cases the parties entered into
consent decrees which prohibited various forms of deceptive conduct,
such as claiming that truthful negative items could be removed from a
consumer's credit files, representing that credit cards could be obtained
for all clients, or advertising that credit lines could readily be established
in clients' names." 2 In a few instances, targeted CROs have agreed to
fund consumer education campaigns, warning consumers about false
credit repair claims." 3 At least one investigation led to criminal indict-
Credit Practices, FTC); ef Milbauer v. TRW, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 92, 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)
(holding that bureau could require written permission from consumer but must disclose to
third party if permission is given); STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY, supra note 4, cmt. 4 to
§ 609 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (1988)), at 18,822 (bureau "may" disclose to third party
with written power of attorney).
108. Section 611 requires the bureau to investigate disputes "directly conveyed to the con-
sumer reporting agency by the consumer." 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (1988).
109. See STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY, supra note 4, cmt. 8 to § 611 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1681i), at 18,824; FTC Staff Opinion Letter, Aug. 4, 1987, reprinted in OOBURN,
supra note 4, at 344-45.
110. Milbauer, 707 F. Supp. at 96.
111. See In re Steven Leff, No. 89-2046-H (N.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 1989); In re American Credit
Servs., Inc., No. 89-3651 KN (SX) (C.D. Ca. June 6, 1989); In re Credit Repair, Inc., No. 89-
C-0344 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 1989); In re Nationwide Credit Servs., Inc., No. 88-4071 (E.D. La.
Sept. 15, 1988); In re Action Credit Sys., Inc., No. C-88-1322-EFL (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 1988);
In re Credit Rite, Inc., No. 88-1206 (GEB) (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 1988); In re Thornburg v. Inter-
national Business Serv., No. 88 CVS 11045 (Super. Ct., Wake Co., N.C. Dec. 9, 1988). See
generally Fortney, supra note 16, at 1019 (describing FTC enforcement actions against credit
repair "counselors"); Fortney, supra note 36, at 1309 (noting that investigations of credit coun-
seling firms would be pursued vigorously); Noonan, supra note 10, at 1071 (discussing decep-
tive practices in field of credit repair).
112. See cases cited supra note 111.
113. See FTC v. Liberto, No. 86 Civ. 4237 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1986) (advertising); In re
George Tannous, 107 F.T.C. 488, 495 (1986) (radio campaign).
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ments."l 4 For the most part, however, the enforcement efforts have
proven ineffective in curbing credit repair abuses, as new companies
form, operate for a short while, and then move or liquidate before au-
thorities detect a pattern of consumer abuse.115 The investigations did
draw attention to the problem, and state legislatures have responded with
a variety of regulatory approaches.
III. STATE REGULATION OF CROs AS A MODEL
FOR FEDERAL ACTION
More than thirty states and the District of Columbia have enacted
some form of legislation regulating the activities of CROs. 1" 6 The laws
range from outright prohibition of credit repair services in one state" 7 to
modest licensing requirements in others."' In between are various,
sometimes innovative, laws that acknowledge a legitimate commercial
role for credit service organizations, but protect against the potential for
deception and consumer injury. The laws present an interesting study of
alternative approaches to this relatively new consumer problem. They
114. See 1988 CRO Hearing, supra note 13, at 3-6 (statement of Kenneth P. Walter, In-
spector, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
115. According to the FTC, the "fly-by-night" nature of the CRO industry makes adminis-
trative enforcement extremely difficult. Even when the FTC has located the principals of a
fraudulent CRO, the proceeds usually have been spent. Id. at 124 (statement of the FTC).
116. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1701 to -1712 (Supp. 1991); ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 4-91-101 to -109 (Michie Supp. 1991); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1789.10-.24 (West 1985 & Supp.
1992); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 12-14.5-101 to -113 (1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-4351
(West Supp. 1991); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-4601 to -4608 (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 817.7001, .7005, .701-.706 (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-59 (Michie 1988);
HAW. REv. STAT § 481B-12 (Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE §§ 26-2222 to -2252 (1990 & Supp.
1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121'/2, paras. 2101-2116 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 24-5-15-1 to -11 (Bums 1991 & Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 533C.1 -.14 (West
Supp. 1991); Act of April 18, 1991, ch. 156, 1991 Kan. Sess. Laws 1037; LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 9:3573.1-.8 (West 1991); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, §§ 10-101 to -401 (West Supp.
1990); MD. COM. LAW II CODE ANN. §§ 14-1901 to -1916 (1990 & Supp. 1991); MAss. ANN.
LAWS ch. 93, §§ 68A-68E (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.1701 -
.1708 (West Supp. 1991) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 23.1125(91)-(98) (Callaghan 1991)); Act of
May 30, 1991, ch. 314, 1991 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1494 (West); Credit Services Organization
Act, ch. 292, 1991 Neb. Laws 902; NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 598.281 -.289 (1987); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 359-D:1 to :11 (Supp. 1990); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 458-a to -k (McKinney
Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 131-147 (West Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 47-18-1001 to -1011 (1988); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 18.01 -.15 (West 1987 &
Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-21-1 to -9 (1986 & Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 59.1-335.1 to -335.12 (Michie Supp. 1991); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 19.134.010 -.900
(West 1989 & Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-6C-1 to -12 (Supp. 1991).
117. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-59(b), (c) (Michie 1988).
118. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 26-2223 (1990); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 445.1703(a)-(h)
(West Supp. 1991) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 23.1125(93a)-(93h) (Callaghan 1991)); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, §§ 145-147 (West Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6C-5 (Supp. 1991).
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thus provide a generous reservoir of ideas for potential federal legislation
on the subject.
Some consumer representatives have questioned whether federal
CRO legislation is necessary or even advisable, urging instead that CROs
either be prohibited altogether or regulated by individual states as the
need arises. 119 The case for prohibition has support from a former man-
ager of a large credit repair company.1 20  CRO opponents argue that
CROs create most of their revenues by promising to do what cannot law-
fully be done-to remove negative, but accurate, information from credit
records.12 1 They contend that no legitimate role thus exists for CROs in
the credit reporting system. While there is some evidence to support this
position,1 22 most state and federal consumer protection authorities have
concluded that the private sector can play a legitimate role in helping
consumers understand the FCRA and exercise their statutory rights. 123
Many professions charge fees for lending assistance in areas in which
consumers have little experience,124 and the FCRA has proven to be a
difficult statute for consumers to enforce without guidance. Consumers
can benefit from properly drafted legislation that reduces the likelihood
of CRO fraud but allows legitimate credit services to be performed for
compensation. Outright prohibition would unnecessarily eliminate the
beneficial functions performed by CROs along with the deceptive
practices.
Most state legislatures have concluded that CROs should be permit-
ted to perform credit service activities, but that some regulation of the
119. See, eg., 1990 FCRA Hearin& supra note 7, at 682-83 (statement of Hubert H.
Humphrey, III, Attorney General, State of Minnesota).
120. See 1988 CRO Hearing, supra note 13, at 9, 11 (statement of Jeffrey Roberts, former
co-owner of Credit-Rite, Inc.).
121. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-59 (Michie 1988).
122. See 1988 CRO Hearing, supra note 13, at 9-11 (statement of Jeffrey Roberts, former
co-owner of Credit-Rite, Inc.); Kathleen A. Hughes, Credit Clinics May Make It Sound Too
Easy to Clean Up a Bad Record, WALL ST. J., June 16, 1986, at 35; Leonard Sloane, Pros, Cons
of Credit Clinics; Repair Claims Draw Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1985, at D4.
123. See 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 946 (statement of Janet D. Steiger,
Chairperson, FTC); id. at 576-80 (reproduction of letter from James M. Shannon, Attorney
General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, to Rep. Richard H. Lehman, Chairperson, Sub-
committee on Consumer Affairs and Coinage (Sept. 26, 1989)); 1988 CRO Hearing, supra note
13, at 11 (statement of Rep. John Hiler).
124. Indeed, lawyers routinely charge fees for consulting on FCRA issues. See 1988 CRO
Hearing, supra note 13, at 27 (statement of George L. Rayburn, Assistant Commissioner of
Consumer Credit, State of Maryland). The legal profession, however, is policed by ethical
rules and standards, and an attorney likely would lose his license for taking advantage of the
public as some CROs have. See Milbauer v. TRW, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 92, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
Some CROs might be operated in such a way as to be deemed the practice of law. See 1985
Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 75, 76.
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industry is needed, given the extraordinary history of CROs perpetrating
consumer fraud. While state laws can be helpful in reducing the likeli-
hood of consumer injury, the case for national legislation is also strong.
CRO fraud is a nationwide problem. Consumers are being injured by
CRO misrepresentations throughout the United States, often by compa-
nies operating across state boundaries."2 5 Many states have no law gov-
erning CRO activity, and federal legislation would provide a base level of
protection-through mandatory disclosures and prohibitions of certain
predatory sales tactics-to consumers in those states. Congress enacted
the FCRA under similar circumstances. In 1970 consumers were expres-
sing widespread dissatisfaction with the activities of credit bureaus,126
and although interstate bureaus existed, most bureaus conducted busi-
ness on a local level. 27 Federal legislation created a minimum level of
consumer protection for all consumers and served as a model for legisla-
tion in states where no protection previously existed
12 8
More important, however, the benefits to consumers in states where
CRO legislation does exist can be diluted if out-of-state CROs solicit
business through advertisements in local newspapers or on television list-
ing toll-free long distance numbers.12 9 The entire CRO transaction can
take place through the mails and telephone lines. State and local law-
enforcement officials may suspect a violation of their state's CRO law,
but they may find it difficult to conduct investigations and prosecute
wrongdoers across state boundaries.'3 0 Thus, even if a state has at-
tempted to protect its residents by enacting a CRO law, injury to its resi-
dents can continue because the law is difficult to enforce against
125. See 1988 CRO Hearing, supra note 13, at 125-26 (statement of the FTC); id at 23
(statement of George L. Rayburn, Assistant Commissioner of Consumer Credit, State of
Maryland).
126. See Fair Credit Reporting, 1969: Hearings on S. 823 Before the Subcomm. on Finan-
cial Institutions of the Senate Banking and Currency Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 82-90 (1969)
(statement of Professor Alan F. Westin, Columbia University); id. at 108-12 (statement of
Wendell G. Lindsay, Jr., Louisiana Consumers' League); id. at 112-18 (statement of Erma
Angevine, Executive Director, Consumers' Federation of America); id. at 123-32 (joint state-
ment of Sarah H. Newman, General Secretary, National Consumers' League, and Benny L.
Kass, Consultant, National Legal Aid and Defender Association).
127. See 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 227 (statement of Walter R. Kurth, Presi-
dent, Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc.); Note, The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 56 MINN. L.
REV. 819, 820 (1972).
128. Oklahoma may have been the only state regulating the credit reporting industry
before 1970. 2 ALPERIN & CHASE, supra note 31, § 531, at 220 n.4.
129. See 1988 CROHearing, supra note 13, at 74, 75, 78 (newspaper advertisements); ia at
23 (statement of George L. Rayburn, Assistant Commissioner of Consumer Credit, State of
Maryland).
130. Id at 23 (statement of George L. Rayburn, Assistant Commissioner of Consumer
Credit, State of Maryland).
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nonresident CROs. The FTC currently can police CROs in any state by
proving that certain practices are "unfair or deceptive" under the FTC
Act, but its resources are limited and its enforcement powers under the
Act are weak, often restricted to the issuance of a "cease and desist"
order.' Federal CRO legislation would not solve these enforcement
problems entirely, but it could provide a mechanism that allows federal
and state consumer protection authorities to prosecute CRO scams more
easily wherever they are located. By enacting national legislation that
makes specific conduct of CROs illegal wherever it occurs, and subject-
ing such conduct to civil penalties as well as statutory damages for af-
fected consumers, Congress could empower the FTC, state attorneys
general, and individual consumers to police CRO activities more
vigorously.
An additional benefit of national CRO legislation would be the pro-
motion of standard disclosures in CRO solicitations and contracts. Stan-
dard disclosures could benefit both the industry and consumers. The
industry would benefit by a law that requires unscrupulous CROs to play
by the same rules as lawful businesses, and by the improved image of the
industry in the eyes of the public. Consumers would benefit from stan-
dard disclosures that provide critical information and make it easier to
compare the advertised services of competing CROs. The federal statute
need not preempt state laws entirely; the state laws could continue to
apply if they are consistent with the federal statute,132 but the federal law
and its mandated minimum disclosures would ensure a large measure of
similarity in CRO transactions. The FTC, credit bureaus, consumer
groups, 33 and even CRO representatives, who are interested in standard-
ization and improving the industry's image,'34 all support congressional
efforts to enact legislation regulating the industry. This is one subject on
131. Under § 5 of the FTC Act, the FTC has authority to enjoin future unlawful conduct
through a consent decree or cease-and-desist order. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1988). Except for vio-
lations of specific trade regulation rules or an existing cease-and-desist order, the FTC cannot
impose civil penalties for deceptive conduct. See id at § 45(/), (m). The Commission has been
seeking to expand its enforcement powers with respect to the FCRA and has requested author-
ity to impose civil penalties on businesses committing CRO deception. See 1990 FCRA Hear-
ing, supra note 7, at 548 (statement of Jean Noonan, Associate Director for Credit Practices,
FTC).
132. In enacting the FCRA, Congress provided that credit bureaus must also comply with
consistent state laws regulating reporting activities. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t (1988). States are au-
thorized to provide greater consumer protection than the minimum standards imposed by the
FCRA. See Lucinda A. Low, Comment, Preemption of State Credit Reporting Legislation:
Toward Validation of State Authority, 24 UCLA L. REv. 83, 99-101 (1976).
133. See, eg., 1989FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 98 (statement of Elgie Holstein, Execu-
tive Director, Bankcard Holders of America).
134. See 1988 CRO Hearing, supra note 13, at 107 (statement of Elena Halford, President,
American Association of Credit, Inc.).
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which Congress can, with relatively little opposition, enact a law that
simultaneously will help consumers and not unduly burden the business
community. Under these circumstances, Congress should seize the
opportunity.
The experience of state legislatures can be useful to Congress as it
considers a national regulatory scheme.13 5  State laws contain several
provisions that may reduce the likelihood of deception while allowing
CROs to provide lawful assistance to consumers in need. These laws
generally provide three types of consumer protection: prohibitions
against certain unfair or deceptive conduct, mandatory disclosures prior
to consummation of the credit services contract, and certain ameliorative
provisions, including a right of rescission, required in the contract itself.
A. Prohibited Activities
Many state CRO laws prohibit certain fraudulent practices that
have been the subject of consumer complaints in the past. Most of these
provisions are not objectionable, even to many credit repair dealers, 136
and may provide the consumer with rights not available at common law
or under other state consumer-protection legislation. Not surprisingly,
nearly all of the acts prohibit misrepresentation in the advertising or pro-
motion of credit services, but several extend beyond common-law fraud
and prohibit "misleading" statements3 7 or "indirect" misrepresenta-
135. In recent years, Congress has considered several bills that would regulate CROs. See
H.R. 194, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 4213, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R. 458,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
136. See 1988 CRO Hearing, supra note 13, at 107 (statement of Elena Halford, President,
American Association of Credit, Inc.).
137. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1703(4) (Supp. 1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-91-
106(4) (Michie Supp. 1991); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1789.13(d) (West 1985); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 12-14.5-104(l)(c) (1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4603(4) (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 817.7005(4) (West Supp. 1991); HAw. REV. STAT. § 481B-12(a)(1) (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 2105(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-15-5(4)
(BuMs 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 533C.3(3),(4) (West Supp. 1991); Act of April 18, 1991, ch.
156, § 3(c), 1991 Kan. Sess. Laws 1037, 1038; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3573.3(4) (West
1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 10-304(1) (West Supp. 1990); MD. COM. LAw II
CODE ANN. § 14-1902(4), (5) (Supp. 1991); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, § 68B(4) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1703(c) (West Supp. 1991) (MICH STAT. ANN.
§ 23.1123(93)(c) (Callaghan 1991)); Act of May 20, 1991, ch. 314, § 5(4), 1991 Minn. Sess.
Law Serv. 1494, 1496 (West); Credit Services Organization Act, ch. 292, § 4(4), (5), 1991 Neb.
Laws 902, 904; NEv. REv. STAT. § 598.282(4) (1987); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 359-D:3(IV)
(Supp. 1990); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 458-h(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, § 133(4) (West Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-1003(4) (1988); TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 18.03(3), (4) (West Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-335.5(4) (Michie
Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.134.020(4) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991); W. VA.
CODE § 46A-6C-3(3), (4) (Supp. 1991).
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tions138 as well. One law also provides that the consumer need not prove
reliance on the fraudulent or misleading statement, 139 thereby removing
one of the obstacles to consumer deception cases under common law.1 "
Although these general prohibitions overlap to some extent with the pro-
scriptions against deceptive conduct in the FTC Act and state unfair
trade practices acts,141 some of the state laws also set forth specific exam-
ples of misleading promises that might otherwise be considered "puf-
fing," such as guaranteeing to erase bad credit records or to extend credit
regardless of credit history.142 Nearly all of the acts also prohibit CROs
from advising consumers to make any statement to a credit bureau or a
prior creditor if the consumer should realize that the statement is false or
misleading. 43 These provisions are intended to curb the "shotgun" ap-
proach of counseling consumers to dispute virtually every item in their
files, hoping that the bureau will delete negative items when the time for
investigating the disputes has expired.
One fairly standard state-law prohibition that may not be justified is
138. See, eg., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 458-1(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
139. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.7005(4) (West Supp. 1991).
140. See Williams v. Rank & Son Buick, Inc., 44 Wis. 2d 239, 245-47, 170 N.W.2d 807,
810-11 (1969); MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD, CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS 6 (2d ed. 1991).
141. The FTC issued a policy statement in 1983 listing three elements of deceptive con-
duct: (1) there must be a representation, practice, or omission likely to mislead consumers; (2)
consumers must interpret the message reasonably under the circumstances; and (3) the mis-
leading effects must be material. See In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 175 (1984).
Several state unfair trade practices laws are modeled after the FTC Act, and courts applying
such laws look to FTC precedents for guidance. See, eg., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
142. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 481B-12(a)(1) (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2,
para. 2105(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-15-5(4) (Burns 1991); Act of
April 18, 1991, ch. 156, § 3(c)(1), (2), 1991 Kan. Sess. Laws 1037, 1038; Credit Services Or-
ganization Act, ch. 292, § 4(4), 1991 Neb. Laws 902, 904; W. VA. CODE § 46A-6C-3(3) (Supp.
1991).
143. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1703(3) (Supp. 1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-91-
106(3) (Michie Supp. 1991); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1789.13(c) (West 1985); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 12-14.5-104(1)(b) (1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4603(3) (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 817.7005(3) (West Supp. 1991); HAw. REv. STAT. § 481B-12(a)(3) (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 2105(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-15-5(3)
(Burns 1991); Act of April 18, 1991, ch. 156, § 3(e), 1991 Kan. Sess. Laws 1037, 1038; LA.
REV. STAT; ANN. § 9:3573.3(3) (West 1991); MD. COM. LAW II CODE ANN. § 14-1902(3)
(Supp. 1991); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, § 68B(3) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1991); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 445.1703(b) (West Supp. 1991) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 23.1125(93)(b) (Calla-
ghan 1991)); Act of May 30, 1991, ch. 314, § 5(3), 1991 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1494, 1496
(West); Credit Services Organization Act, ch. 292, § 4(6), 1991 Neb. Laws 902, 904; NEv.
REv. STAT. § 598.282(3) (1987); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 359-D:3(III) (Supp. 1990); N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 458-h(2) (McKinney Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 133(3)
(West Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-1003(3) (1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-
335.5(3) (Michie Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.134.020(3) (West 1989 & Supp.
1991); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6C-3(5) (Supp. 1991).
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a ban against CROs receiving compensation for referring consumers to a
retail seller who may extend credit to the client on the same terms as
those available to the general public. 1" One rationale for prohibiting
such a provision is that consumers receive little or no value for such
advice because they could have contacted the retailer themselves and ob-
tained the credit without the assistance of the CRO. Yet many consum-
ers can benefit from such information because they are not likely to have
wide access to the credit policies of many retailers and therefore may be
unaware of available credit opportunities. Providing information on
credit alternatives traditionally has been a legitimate fumction of credit
counselors and need not be discouraged so long as the information is
complete and accurate. A CRO that misleads a consumer into believing
that the referral is a special offer not available to the general public usu-
ally runs afoul of one of the other statutory prohibitions dealing with
deceptive conduct. Straightforward advice on credit availability can be
valuable to consumers who have contacted CROs because they perceive
no credit alternatives. Congress should think twice before following the
various state laws on this point.
Most of the state CRO laws attempt to address the problem of con-
sumers paying large sums of money, receiving few or no services in re-
turn, and being unable to obtain a refund because the CRO has moved or
gone out of business. One approach has been to prohibit CROs from
accepting any fee until the contracted services have been completed. 45
144. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1703(2) (Supp. 1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-91-
106(2) (Michie Supp. 1991); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1789.13(b) (West 1985); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 28-4603(2) (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.7005(2) (West Supp. 1991); HAw. REV. STAT.
§ 481B-12(a)(2) (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 2105(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-15-5(2) (Burns 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 533C.3(2) (West
Supp. 1991); Act of April 18, 1991, ch. 156, § 3(b), 1991 Kan. Sess. Laws 1037, 1038; LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3573.3(2) (West 1991); MD. COM. LAW II CODE ANN. § 14-1902(2)
(Supp. 1991); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, § 68B(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 445-1703(a) (West Supp. 1991) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 23.1125(93)(a) (Calla-
ghan 1991)); Act of May 30, 1991, ch. 314, § 5(2), 1991 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1494, 1496
(West); Credit Services Organization Act, ch. 292, § 4(3), 1991 Neb. Laws 902, 904; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 133(2) (West Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-1003(2) (1988);
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 18.03(2) (West Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-
335.5(2) (Michie Supp. 1991); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.134.020(2) (West 1989 & Supp.
1991); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6C-3(2) (Supp. 1991).
145. See Act of May 30, 1991, ch. 314, § 5(1), 1991 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1494, 1496
(West); Credit Services Organization Act, ch. 292, § 4(2), 1991 Neb. Laws 902, 904 (only if
service is obtaining extension of credit); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 458-e (McKinney Supp.
1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-1003(1) (1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-335.5(1) (Michie
Supp. 1991). This approach is supported by the major credit bureaus, which believe that
CROs will not survive if prohibited from collecting fees at the outset of the transaction. See
1990 FCRA Hearing, supra note 7, at 189 (statement of Walter R. Kurth, President, Associ-
ated Credit Bureaus).
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Other states have recognized that such a prohibition may be too harsh
and could result in unscrupulous or impoverished consumers withhold-
ing earned fees from legitimate CROs. Some laws therefore allow CROs
to collect payment prior to the completion of services, but only if the
CRO has secured a bond to serve as a fund for aggrieved consumers,
usually in the amount of $10,000.146
Three problems with these bond requirements have surfaced. First,
while a $10,000 bond may sufficiently cover the damages of a handful of
defrauded consumers, it hardly suffices if a CRO engages in widespread
fraud and then disappears without a trace. 147 Second, some CROs have
complained that the adverse publicity surrounding the industry in recent
years has made it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain bonds from li-
censed sureties.1 48 In response to this concern, some states now permit
146. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1703(1), -1708(c) (Supp. 1991) (bond or trust
equal to 5% of total fees of last 12 months; $5,000 minimum and $25,000 maximum); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 4-91-106(a)(1) (Michie Supp. 1991) (bond of $10,000 required); CAL. CIv.
CODE §§ 1789.13(a), .18(d) (West 1985) (bond or trust equal to 5% of total fees of last 12
months; $5,000 minimum and $25,000 maximum); COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-14.5-104(1)(a)
(1991) (bond, $10,000); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-4603(1), -4604(a) (1991) (bond or trust,
$25,000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.7005(1) (West Supp. 1991) (bond, $10,000); IDAHO CODE§§ 26-2232, -2232A (1990 & Supp. 1991) (must have bond to operate); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
1211/2, paras. 2105(1), 2110 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) (bond amount $100,000); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 24-5-15-5(1), 24-5-15-8(a) (Bums 1991) (bond, $10,000); IOWA CODE ANN.§§ 533C.3(1), 533C.4(6) (West Supp. 1991) (bond, $10,000); Act of April 18, 1991, ch. 156,§§ 3(a), 4(e), 1991 Kan. Sess. Laws 1037, 1038, 1039 (bond amount $25,000); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:3573.3(1) (West 1991) (bond amount $5,000); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 10-
202 (West Supp. 1990) (must have bond to operate); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, § 68B(1)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991) (bond, $10,000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1703c (Vest
Supp. 1991) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 23.1125(93)(c) (Callaghan 1991)) (must have bond and
financial statement to operate); Act of May 30, 1991, ch. 314, § 4, 1991 Minn. Sess. Law Serv.
1494, 1495 (West) (must have bond to operate); Credit Services Organization Act, ch. 292,§§ 4(1), 5(1), 1991 Neb. Laws 902, 903, 904 (bond amount $100,000); NEV. REV. STAT.§§ 598.282(1), 598.285(2) (1987) (bond amount $50,000); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-
D:3(I), 359-D:8(IV) (Supp. 1990) (bond amount equal to 5% total fees of previous 12 months;
$5,000 minimum and $25,000 maximum); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 133(1) (West Supp.
1992); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 18.03(1) (West Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-
335.4 (Michie Supp. 1991) (bond or letter of credit required to operate; valued at 100 times
standard fee; $5,000 minimum and $50,000 maximum); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 19.134.020(1) (West Supp. 1991) (bond, $10,000); W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-6C-3(l), -4(e)
(Supp. 1991) ($15,000 bond).
147. This is one reason why the FTC opposes the bond requirement in federal legislation.
See 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 954-55 (reproduction of letter from Daniel Oliver,
Chairman, FTC, to Rep. Frank Annunzio (May 11, 1987)). An alternative is to increase the
bond requirement to, for example, $50,000 for each state in which the CRO does business. See
1990 FCRA4 Hearing, supra note 7, at 683-84 (reproduction of letter from Hubert H.
Humphrey, III, Attorney General, State of Minnesota, to Rep. Richard H. Lehman (June 7,
1990)).
148. See 1988 CRO Hearing, supra note 13, at 27 (statement of Elena Halford, President,
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CROs to establish trust accounts at independent financial institutions,149
or allow the CROs to collect fees up front if they are deposited in a segre-
gated escrow account until the services are completed.' 50 Third, the stat-
utes do not set forth a method for determining how the bond or trust
account will be distributed among competing claimants if the judgments
exceed the principal amount in the fund.
The pervasive problem of CROs disappearing after defrauding con-
sumers in several states highlights one area in which federal legislation
can fill the gaps left by the state laws. Given the interstate nature of
many CROs, any pattern of deception likely will result in claims being
made by a large number of consumers from several states. There should
be a bond or trust account sufficient to satisfy the injured parties, or at
least a predictable, orderly way of allocating the limited funds among
defrauded consumers. Leaving the issue to be resolved by individual
states may result in a disproportionate number of CROs locating in the
states with lenient bonding requirements, or no requirement at all.
The principal obstacle to a federal bonding or trust requirement is
the bureaucracy needed to administer the fund. To be effective, the law
must provide for administration by some authority, and it is unlikely that
the FTC, the principal federal consumer protection agency, would wel-
come the additional workload."5 ' The law could provide that the bond
or trust be administered by a consumer protection agency designated by
the state in which the CRO is licensed. An efficient alternative would be
to follow the lead of those states which allow CROs to collect fees up
American Association of Credit, Inc.); id. at 23 (statement of George L. Rayburn, Assistant
Commissioner of Consumer Credit, State of Maryland).
149. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-91-106(a)(1) (Michie Supp. 1991) (requiring trust in addi-
tion to bond); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1789.13(a) (West 1985) (requiring surety bond or trust ac-
count); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4603(1) (1991) (same); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.7005(1) (West
Supp. 1991) (requiring bond and trust); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-15-5(1) (Burns 1991) (irrevo-
cable letter of credit as alternative); IOWA CODE ANN. § 533C.3(1) (West Supp. 1991) (surety
account as alternative); Act of April 18, 1991, ch. 156, § 3(a), 1991 Kan. Sess. Laws 1037,
1038 (surety account as alternative); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3573.3(1) (West 1991) (bond
and trust); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, § 68B(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991) (bond and trust);
Act of May 30, 1991, ch. 314, § 4, 1991 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1494, 1495 (West) (cash or
securities as alternative); Credit Services Organization Act, ch. 292, § 4(1), 1991 Neb. Laws
902, 903 (surety account as alternative); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 133(1) (West Supp.
1992) (bond and trust); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 18.03(1) (West Supp. 1991) (surety
account as alternative); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-335.4 (Michie Supp. 1991) (letter of credit as
alternative); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.134.020(1) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991) (bond and
trust); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6C-3(1) (Supp. 1991) (surety account as alternative).
150. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.7005(1) (West Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-
A, § 10-301 (West Supp. 1990).
151. Indeed, this is an objection of the FTC to bond requirements. See 1990 FCRA Hear-
ing, supra note 7, at 548 (statement of Jean Noonan, Associate Director for Credit Practices,
FTC).
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front, but only if the money is held in escrow at a licensed financial insti-
tution until the completion of services."52 This solution provides some
assurance to both the consumer and the CRO that their interests will be
protected, and it avoids the creation of a government bureaucracy to ad-
minister a bond or trust account. One potential problem with this ap-
proach, however, is that unlike the lump-sum bond or trust account,
which can be verified by a state licensing agency before the CRO begins
operation, an escrow account may require regular supervision by the
agency to ensure that the CRO is complying with the law on a case-by-
case basis and is not simply depositing the consumer's money in its own
operating account. To encourage compliance on a regular basis through
private enforcement, CRO customers should be notified of the escrow
requirement, either in the CRO contract itself or in precontract
disclosures.
B. Pre-Contract Disclosures
Most states require CROs to issue disclosure statements to potential
customers prior to signing the contract, and to retain copies of the state-
ments for a number of years thereafter. Required disclosures typically
include a complete and detailed description of the services to be per-
formed, the total fees the consumer will be obligated to pay, and the
consumer's right to proceed against a bond, trust, or escrow account, if
applicable. 53 Experience from other consumer protection statutes, such
as the federal Truth-in-Lending Act,154 shows that consumers often view
152. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
153. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1704, -1705 (Supp. 1991); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-
91-107, -108 (Michie Supp. 1991); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1789.14, .15 (West 1985); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 12-14.5-106, -107 (1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-4351 (b) (disclosures in-
cluded in contract) (West Supp. 1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4605(a),(b) (1991); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 817:702, .703 (West Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 2106 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-15-6 (Bums 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 533C.6
(West Supp. 1991); Act of April 18, 1991, ch. 156, § 6, 1991 Kan. Sess. Laws 1037, 1040-41;
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3573.6 (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 10-303 (West
Supp. 1990); MD. COM. LAW II CODE ANN. §§ 14-1904, -1905 (1990 & Supp. 1991); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 93, § 68C (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.1704,
.1705 (West Supp. 1991) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 23.1125(95) (Callaghan 1991)); Act of May 30,
1991, ch. 314, § 6, 1991 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1494, 1496-97 (West); Credit Services Organi-
zation Act, ch. 292, § 7, 1991 Neb. Laws 902, 906-07; NEV. REV. STAT. § 598.283 (1987);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-D:4 to -D:5 (Supp. 1990); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 458-c, -d
(McKinney Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 135, 136 (Vest Supp. 1992); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-1004, -1005 (1988); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 18.06 (West 1987
& Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-21-5, -6 (1986); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-335.6, -
335.7 (Michie Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.134.040, .050 (West 1989); W. VA.
CODE § 46A-6C-6 (Supp. 1991).
154. Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, tit. VI, § 601,
94 Stat. 168 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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disclosures of this nature as boilerplate and seldom read them or under-
stand their import.155 Their influence on consumer behavior therefore
will likely be small, but there is little harm in imposing such provisions,
and they may prove helpful subsequently in litigation over an alleged
breach of contract or misrepresentation.
Several states, however, require disclosures that may have an effect
on consumers' decisionmaking processes. More than half of the state
laws mandate disclosure of the basic consumer rights under the FCRA,
such as the right to review one's credit file (free of charge in some cir-
cumstances) and to dispute information in the file. 1 6 Upon learning of
this information, some consumers may decide to forgo the services of a
CRO and try to correct erroneous credit information themselves. A few
states go further and require CROs to provide a conspicuous statement
that accurate information in credit reports cannot be removed perma-
nently and that adverse information lawfully can be reported for seven to
ten years. 57 After learning these facts, some consumers may realize that
there is little, if anything, to gain from engaging the services of a CRO if
their credit problems stem from accurate, albeit negative, reports.158
155. See Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Impact of Truth-in-Lending Disclosures on Consumer
Market Behavior: A Critique of the Critics of Truth-in-Lending Law, 9 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
117, 120-21 (1984); Jonathan M. Landers & Ralph J. Rohner, A Functional Analysis of Truth
in Lending, 26 UCLA L. REv. 711, 727-28 (1979); James P. Nehf, Effective Regulation of
Rent-to-Own Contracts, 52 Omio ST. L.J. 751, 777-845 (1991).
156. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1705(1), (2) (Supp. 1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-91-
108(1) (Michie Supp. 1991); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1789.15(a), (b) (West 1985); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 12-14.5-107(1) (1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-4351 (b) (West Supp. 1991);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4605(b)(1)-(4), (8) (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.703(1), (2) (West
Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 2106(1)-(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND.
CODE ANN. § 24-5-15-6(4) to (6) (Burns 1991); Act of April 18, 1991, ch. 156, § 6(4)-(6), 1991
Kan. Sess. Laws 1037, 1040-41; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3573.6(1), (2) (West 1991); MD.
COM. LAW II CODE ANN. § 14-1905(1)-(4) (Supp. 1991); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, § 68C(1)-
(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1705(a), (b) (West Supp. 1991)
(MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 23.1125(95)(a), (b) (Callaghan 1991)); Act of May 30, 1991, ch. 314,
§ 6(2), 1991 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1494, 1496-97 (West); Credit Services Organization Act,
ch. 292, § 7(1)(d)-(f), 1991 Neb. Laws 902, 906-07; NEV. REv. STAT. § 598.283(1) (1987);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-D:5 (I), (II) (Supp. 1990); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 458-d (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 136(1), (2) (West Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-18-1005 (1), (2) (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-21-6(1)-(4) (1986); VA. CODE
ANN. § 59.1-335.7(1), (2) (Michie Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.134.050(1), (2)
(West 1989); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6C-6(a)(4)-(6) (Supp. 1991).
157. COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-14.5-107(1)(a) (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.703(3) (West
Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-15-6(4) (Burns 1991); Act of April 18, 1991, ch. 156,
§ 6(7), 1991 Kan. Sess. Law 1037, 1041; MD. COM. LAW II CODE ANN. § 14-1905(6) (Supp.
1991); Act of May 30, 1991, ch. 314, § 6(2), 1991 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1494, 1496-97 (West);
Credit Services Organization Act, ch. 292, § 7(1)(g), (h), 1991 Neb. Laws 902, 907; W. VA.
CODE § 46A-6C-6(a)(7) (Supp. 1991).
158. The FrC favors such disclosure in federal CRO legislation. See 1990 FCRA Hearing,
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Moreover, in several states CROs are required to inform consumers that
nonprofit credit counseling is available from other sources." 9 All of
these provisions are intended to discourage the use of CROs by highlight-
ing the alternatives. While it may be unprecedented to require a business
to inform potential customers of ways to avoid using the offered service,
the checkered history of CROs may justify market interference. Each of
these disclosures fosters greater understanding of the vastly misunder-
stood consumer reporting system, and many consumers may benefit if
such information is mandated in CRO transactions across the country.
Indeed, because consumers who contact CROs are likely to be in the
greatest need of information about the FCRA,1 ° requiring these contract
disclosures may result in a successful national educational campaign
where past efforts have failed.
C. Mandatory Contract Provisions
All state laws require contracts for CRO services to be written,
signed, and dated, with copies given to the consumer at the time of con-
tracting. The laws require disclosure of standard provisions, such as the
terms and conditions of all payments to be made by the consumer, a full
and detailed description of services to be performed, promises of guaran-
tees, refund policies, and an estimate of the time of completion.1 61 Al-
supra note 7, at 584-86 (statement of Jean Noonan, Associate Director for Credit Practices,
FrC).
159. See IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-15-6(9) (Burns 1991); Act of April 18, 1991, ch. 156,
§ 6(9), 1991 Kan. Sess. Laws 1037, 1041; Credit Services Organization Act, ch. 292, § 7(1)(i),
1991 Neb. Laws 902, 907; W. VA. CODE § 46A-6C-6(a)(9) (Supp. 1991).
160. CRO customers are often economically disadvantaged and especially vulnerable to
high-pressure sales tactics. See 1990 FCRA Hearing, supra note 7, at 682-83 (statement of
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, State of Minnesota).
161. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1706 (Supp. 1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-91-109
(Michie Supp. 1991); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1789.16 (West 1985); COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-14.5-
108 (1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-4351 (b), (c) (West Supp. 1991); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 28-4605(c) (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.704 (West Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch.
1211/2, para. 2107 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-15-7 (Burns 1991);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 533C.7 (West Supp. 1991); Act of April 18, 1991, ch. 156, § 7, 1991 Kan.
Sess. Laws 1037, 1041-42; LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 9:3573.7 (West 1991); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9-A, § 10-302 (West Supp. 1990); MD. COM. LAW II CODE ANN. § 14-1906 (1990);
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, § 68D (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 445.1706 (West Supp. 1991) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 23.1125(96) (Callaghan 1991)); Act of
May 30, 1991, ch. 314, § 7, 1991 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1494, 1497 (West); Credit Services
Organization Act, ch. 292, § 8, 1991 Neb. Laws 902, 907-08; NEV. REv. STAT. § 598.283
(1987); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 359-D:6 (Supp. 1990); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 458-f (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 137 (West Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 47-18-1006 (1988); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 18.07 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-21-7 (1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-335.8 (Michie Supp. 1991);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.134.060 (West 1989); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6C-7 (Supp. 1991).
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most without exception, they also require that the consumer be afforded
an opportunity to cancel the contract within three or five days after its
consummation.162 Like other consumer protection statutes, such as
those governing home solicitation sales and home equity loans,16 the
CRO laws generally dictate the precise language the CRO must use to
describe the cancellation right and require the CRO to provide the con-
sumer with a separate form to be used when cancelling the contract. The
cancellation right can be effective in curbing CRO abuses, especially
when combined with disclosure of a consumer's rights under the FCRA,
because informed consumers may, upon reflection, decide that the CRO's
services are not worth the price.
The only mandatory contract provision in state CRO acts with ques-
tionable merit is the requirement in a few states that the CRO attach a
copy of the consumer's credit report to the contract, along with notations
of any adverse or negative entries found in the report.'" This provision
seems unwarranted because it forces the CRO to perform substantial
services for the consumer before the consumer has agreed to pay any-
thing. The requirement has potential for the greatest unfairness when
coupled with a consumer's right to cancel the agreement several days
162. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1706(A)(1), (B) (Supp. 1991); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 4-91-109(a)(1)(A), (2) (Michie Supp. 1991); CAL. Civ. CODE § 1789.16(a)(1), (b) (West
1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-14.5-108(I)(a), (2) (1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4605(d)
(1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.704(1)(a), (2) (West Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2,
para. 2107(a)(1), (b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-15-7(a)(1), (b) (Bums
1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 533C.7(1)(a), (2) (West Supp. 1991); Act of April 18, 1991, ch.
156, § 7(a)(1), (b), 1991 Kan. Sess. Laws 1037, 1041, 1041-42; LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:3573.7(A)(1), (B) (West 1991); MD. COM. LAW II CODE ANN. § 14-1906(a)(1), (b) (1990);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, § 68D(a), (b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 445.1706(1)(a), (2) (West Supp. 1991) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 23.1125(96)(1)(a), (2) (Calla-
ghan 1991)); Act of May 30, 1991, ch. 314, § 7(1), (2), 1991 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1494, 1497-
98 (West); Credit Services Organization Act, ch. 292, § 8(1)(a), (3), 1991 Neb. Laws 902, 907,
908; NE v. REv. STAT. § 598.284(4) (1987); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 359-D:6(I)(a), (II)
(Supp. 1990); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 458-f(1)(a), (2) (McKinney Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 137(A)(1), (B) (West Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-1006(a)(1), (b)
(1988); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 18.07(a)(1), (b) (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 13-21-7(1)(a), (2) (1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-335.8(A)(1), (B) (Michie
Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.134.060(1)(a), (2) (West 1989); W. VA. CODE
§ 46A-6C-7(a)(1), (b) (Supp 1991).
163. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (1988) (loans secured by residence); UNIFORM CONSUMER
CREDIT CODE § 3.501, 7A U.L.A. 133 (1974) (home solicitation sales).
164. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-14.5-108(1)(c)(III) (1991) (list of adverse information ap-
pearing in credit report that CRO proposes to modify); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-4351(c)
(West Supp. 1991) (copy of report with adverse entries clearly marked); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 28-4605(c)(2)(A) (1991) (list of adverse information in credit report that CRO proposes to
modify); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-15-7(a)(3) (Burns 1991) (same); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw
§ 458-f(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1991) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-1006(a)(3) (1988)
(same); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-335.8(A)(3) (Michie Supp. 1991) (same).
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later, because the consumer can cancel the contract and still receive, free
of charge, the benefit of work already performed. 165 The supposed justifi-
cation for the provision is to aid the consumer's understanding of the
areas in which the CRO might lend some assistance, thereby helping the
consumer to judge whether the service is worth the price. In this sense, it
is arguably analogous to a free estimate of work to be accomplished by a
home repair company. Yet free estimates are seldom, if ever, required by
law. Investing time and effort with no guarantee of payment may be a
sound business practice, but it is difficult to justify a law, particularly on
a national level, that requires businesses to provide significant services
without compensation.
IV. IMPROVING THE FCRA TO REDUCE RELIANCE ON CROs
Although state and federal regulation of CROs may be warranted to
remedy an apparent pattern of interstate deceptive practices, Congress
also should address the FCRA's more fundamental problems. To help
reduce fraud in the CRO industry and to benefit consumers, Congress
should strengthen the FCRA to decrease the likelihood that consumers
will need outside assistance when confronted with credit problems.1 66
Legislation should focus on long-overdue amendments that further two
goals: (1) improving consumer understanding of their credit reports and
their rights under the FCRA, and (2) requiring that credit bureaus and
users of credit reports be more responsive to consumer inquiries and dis-
putes over incorrectly reported information. Enhancing the FCRA in
these areas would be the most effective way to combat the fraudulent
practices of CROs because it would strike at the very conditions that
make consumers vulnerable to CRO solicitations.
A. Improving Consumer Understanding of the FCRA
Consumers usually have little interest in their credit reports until a
credit application has been denied or some other adverse action has been
taken due to a poor credit report. The potential creditor's rejection no-
165. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-14.5-108(1)(c)(III), (2) (1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-
4605(c)(2)(A), (d) (1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-15-7(a)(3), (b) (Bums 1991); N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW § 458-f(1)(a), (2) (MeKinney Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-1006(a)(3),
(b)(1) (1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-335.8(A)(3), (B) (Michie Supp. 1991).
166. See 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 914 (reproduction of letter from Jane Jan-
sen, President of the National Association of Consumer Agency Administrators, to Bonnie
Guiton, Special Advisor to the President (September 1, 1989)) (stating that there would be no
reason for CROs if credit bureaus were better oriented toward assisting consumers with dis-
putes)). See generally Charles M. Ullman, Liability of Credit Bureaus After the Fair Credit
Reporting Act: The Need for Further Reform, 17 VILL. L. REV. 44, 58-71 (1971) (discussing
the shortcomings of the FCRA and similar state laws).
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tice will often be the consumer's first encounter with the credit reporting
system and the procedures of the FCRA. Under the current system, a
creditor who used the report to deny an application for credit need only
inform the consumer that a credit report was used and provide the con-
sumer with the name and address of the bureau supplying the report. 67
The consumer must then contact the bureau, which, upon the con-
sumer's written request and showing of proper identification, 6 ' will
either explain the contents of the report or send a copy of the file. This
additional step may seem trivial, but it can be time-consuming at a point
when immediate action may be necessary, and can result in the consumer
losing an opportunity to correct quickly an erroneous report and obtain
the credit for which she applied.
With relatively little additional effort and expense, the creditor who
denied the application could provide much more information to the con-
sumer. Since many creditors will have reviewed a hard copy of the re-
port, they could include a copy along with the rejection notice. 169 If the
creditor reviewed the file electronically and could not easily obtain a hard
copy, it could notify the issuing bureau and immediately request that a
copy be sent to the consumer. 170 Creditors and bureaus may object to
such a requirement on the ground that most consumers will not under-
stand a report sent without explanatory documentation.1 7 1 If consumers
need further explanation, however, they can contact the issuing bureau,
which is already required under current law to explain the nature and
substance of the document. 172
More important, the creditor who denied the application should be
required to include a brief form notice, perhaps drafted in plain language
167. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (1988). If a creditor takes adverse action against a consumer
based upon information obtained from a person other than a credit bureau, the creditor may
also have to disclose the nature and substance of that information. Id. § 168 lm(b).
168. Under § 609 of the FCRA, the credit bureau can require identification before disclos-
ing the report to the consumer. Id. § 1681g(a). According to the FTC, the bureau can require
the consumer to make the request in writing and on a form provided by the agency. STATE-
MENT oF GENERAL POLICY, supra note 4, cmt. 3 to § 609 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681g
(1988)), at 18,822. This exchange of correspondence can take a considerable amount of time.
See Martin, supra note 38, at 3 (observing that clearing up errors in report can take weeks or
months).
169. At least one bill recently introduced in Congress requires that a user of a consumer
report who denies a credit application must provide a copy of the report to the consumer along
with the rejection letter. See H.R. 4122, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 7(a)(2)(c) (1990).
170. See 1990 FCRA Hearing, supra note 7, at 324 (statement of Elgie Holstein, Executive
Director, Bankcard Holders of America).
171. See id., supra note 7, at 707-08 (statement of Timothy Ryan, Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion, Department of the Treasury).
172. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a) (1988).
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by the FTC, explaining the consumer's rights under the FCRA. 173 The
notice should not only outline the procedure for correcting erroneous
items, but also should explain that correct information cannot be erased
from the ifies and can lawfully be reported for a certain number of years.
Armed with this information and a copy of the negative report, many
consumers will be able immediately to begin the process of correcting
any incomplete or erroneous information. These changes alone quickly
would provide consumers with more information about their reports and
statutory rights than is currently mandated under all of the notice provi-
sions of the FCRA. The procedures not only would save consumers time
and effort, but would immediately give consumers critical information
about their options (or in the case of correct, complete information, their
lack of recourse) under the law.
The standard notice from the creditor also should include the names
and addresses of the three national credit bureaus,174 along with a state-
ment that the fies of these bureaus may contain similar or different infor-
mation about the consumer, and that consumers should contact each of
the bureaus to verify the accuracy of their reports. To facilitate con-
sumer access to these files, the law should provide that a consumer is
entitled to a free copy of the report from each of the three bureaus when
credit has been denied. These simple procedures will help resolve the
current problem of consumers correcting information in the files of one
bureau without even being aware that the same mistake, or other errors,
could be present in the other large data bases.
B. Responding to Consumer Inquiries
Increased consumer understanding of the contents of their credit re-
ports and of their FCRA rights should lead to less reliance on CROs. If
the credit reporting system remains relatively inhospitable to consumer
inquiries and disputes over the accuracy of information, however, frus-
trated consumers will continue to seek outside assistance. The FCRA
therefore should be strengthened to reduce the incidence of erroneous
and misleading reporting and to encourage more effective corrective
measures when consumers question the contents of their reports.
The FCRA currently focuses primarily on credit bureaus and their
procedures for maintaining accurate reports and effective corrective prac-
tices. Nevertheless, the heart of the reporting system is the creditor who
173. See 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 201, 204 (statement of Bonnie Guiton, Spe-
cial Advisor to the President). Several congressional proposals have included a required notice
of consumer rights. See H.R. 4213, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 109(a)(4) (1990); H.R. 4122, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. § 7(a)(2)(D) (1990).
174. See H.R. 4213, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 109(a)(3) (1990).
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supplies the credit data or loads payment information into the bureau's
data bases. The accurate loading of information is essential to accurate
reporting, yet the FCRA imposes virtually no constraints on creditors
and others who provide information to the credit bureaus. At a mini-
mum, the law should apply the same standard of care to both the bureaus
and the providers, requiring both to maintain reasonable procedures to
ensure maximum possible accuracy."' Consumers currently have no ef-
fective recourse against creditors who carelessly report mistaken infor-
mation to credit bureaus.17 6
In addition, the investigation procedures of the FCRA must be re-
formed to encourage more effective responses to consumer disputes.
Under current law and practice, credit bureaus attempt to complete in-
vestigations within thirty days,' 7 but consumers complain that the inves-
tigations are often cursory and incomplete, sometimes nothing more than
a perfunctory confirmation of the information from the original source
with little or no feedback to the consumer on the results. 17  Consumers
probably would be better served by credit bureaus taking more time and
completing the inquiry more frequently. The Fair Credit Billing Act
(FCBA),17 9 which governs consumer disputes over erroneous entries in
credit bills, may provide an instructive model. Under the FCBA, a credi-
tor must complete its investigation of a disputed item within two billing
cycles after notification of the error, not to exceed ninety days.180 Dur-
175. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e (1988). Banks, retailers, and others who report information to
credit bureaus often do so inaccurately, fail to notify bureaus of closed accounts, and re-report
information previously deleted from consumer reports. Gerri Detweiler & Mary Beth Butler,
Check Your Credit! BHA Takes Aim Against Credit Bureau Practices, 11 BANKCARD CON-
SUMER NEWS, July-Aug. 1991, at 3; see also H.R. 4213, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess. § 112 (1990)
(proposed bill requiring extensive notice to consumer when information about the consumer is
provided to a credit agency, and establishing procedures to ensure accuracy of reported
information).
176. If a creditor conveys erroneous information to a credit bureau, the only recourse
under common law may be an action for defamation; even then the creditor in most cases
would be insulated by a qualified privilege. See, eg., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Holland, 367
A.2d 1311, 1313 (D.C. 1977).
177. See STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY, supra note 4, at 18,805; see also The Wrong
Way to Rewrite Your Credit History, CONSUMER REP., Oct. 1988, at 610 (warning consumers
with poor credit ratings that CROs cannot use the 30-day limit to keep negative but correct
information out of credit report). According to one source, 20% of all investigations take
longer than 30 days to complete. See 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 832 (statement of
Scott Dix, Director, Federal Government Relations, Equifax, Inc.).
178. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
179. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666j (1988). Congress enacted the FCBA on October 28, 1974.
Fair Credit Billing Act, Pub. L. 93-495, § 306, 88 Stat. 1516 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1666-1666j (1988)). The Act covers billing errors and includes other provisions regulating
credit cards.
180. 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a)(B).
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ing that period, the creditor must either correct the item or conduct an
investigation; the creditor can neither attempt to collect the disputed
amount181 nor report the disputed item in a negative way to a credit
bureau"' until the investigation is completed. Following the investiga-
tion, the creditor must either correct the bill or send a written explana-
tion to the consumer setting forth the reasons why the original bill
correctly stated the account, and upon request by the consumer, must
provide copies of documentary evidence in support of its findings.'83
An analogous procedure would improve the FCRA. To encourage
more thorough investigations, the reasonable time for investigating dis-
putes could be increased, perhaps to sixty days, with the provision that
during this period the bureau would have to note the existence of an
ongoing investigation on any credit reports issued. To facilitate timely
completion of the investigation, the law should further require that the
original source of the disputed information respond promptly to the bu-
reau's request for verification of data.'84 Credit bureaus also should be
required, at a minimum, to inform the original source that the consumer
has a specific contention regarding the disputed item, to request a re-
sponse to that contention, and to report back to the consumer with an
explanation of the dispute's outcome and with copies of any supporting
documents. s These procedures would impose an additional burden on
the credit reporting system, but they are not unprecedented and likely
would result in more meaningful investigations and ultimately more ac-
curate reports.
Congress also should make it easier for consumers to ensure that
erroneous information, once corrected, will be accurately reflected in the
files of all three major credit bureaus. This could be accomplished most
efficiently by requiring either the investigating credit bureau or the initial
source of the information to transmit the correction to each of the bu-
reaus. Because the credit reporting system is already substantially auto-
mated and will become increasingly computerized in the future, 86 it
makes sense to mandate the sharing of corrected information by the busi-
nesses operating within the system, rather than requiring the consumer
to institute similar investigation procedures separately with each bureau.
181. Id.
182. Id. § 1666a.
183. Id. § 1666(a)(B)(i)-(ii).
184. Approximately 75% of providers of information apparently respond to credit bureau
investigations within 30 days. See 1989 FCRA Hearing, supra note 3, at 257 (statement of
Walter R. Kurth, President, Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc.).
185. See 1990 FCRA Hearing, supra note 7, at 678 (statement of Hubert H. Humphrey, III,
Attorney General, State of Minnesota).
186. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps the burden could be shared by the bureaus and the original
source of the information, with the party responsible for the error shoul-
dering the burden of correcting it throughout the system. Thus, if the
creditor made the error, it would be required to contact each of the three
national bureaus as well as any local bureaus to which it reported the
erroneous item. 187 The sources of credit information and the credit bu-
reaus likely will be better equipped than the consumer to correct the item
in an efficient manner.
V. CONCLUSION
Reports of widespread deception by CROs have focused much-
needed attention on the FCRA as the principal statute protecting con-
sumer interests in the credit reporting system. The dominant response to
CRO fraud in the state legislatures has been to regulate the activities of
CROs, and some creative methods have been devised. As Congress con-
siders CRO legislation, the existing state regulatory schemes can provide
useful models. Perhaps more important, however, modifying the FCRA
as suggested in this Article should reduce the incentive for consumers to
use CROs, and thus could eliminate some of the deception. The credit
reporting industry has undergone dramatic changes in the twenty years
since the FCRA was enacted. It is time to reexamine the law and make
it more useful to the consumers it was designed to protect.
187. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation supports this proposal. See 1990 FCRA
Hearing, supra note 7, at 755-56 (statement of L. William Seidman, Chairman, Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation).
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